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ABSTRACT 
 
MIMESIS AND SOCIALITY: 
A READING OF THE QUESTION OF LITERATURE 
IN DELEUZE AND DERRIDA 
 
 
Emre Koyuncu 
M.A. in Media and Visual Studies 
Supervisors: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman, Zafer Aracagök 
May, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this study is to discuss the significance of Platonic mimesis in the new 
forms of relationality and sociality proposed in the philosophies of Gilles 
Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. For a better understanding of this relationship, 
this thesis makes a detour through the question of literature in the thoughts of 
these thinkers.  In this view, it is argued that the sociality proposed by Deleuze 
and Derrida challenge the traditional premises of society through the sorcery of 
becoming and wizardry of pharmakos respectively, criticizing the idealization of 
a model for citizenship and the originarization of sociality by way of a linear 
passage between the natural and the political.  
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ÖZET 
 
MİMESİS VE TOPLUMSALLIK:   
DELUZE VE DERRİDA’DA  
EDEBİYAT SORUNSALININ BİR OKUMASI 
 
 
Emre Koyuncu 
Medya ve Görsel Çalışmalar Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Danışmanlar: Yard. Doç. Dr. Mahmut Mutman, Zafer Aracagök 
Mayıs, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı, Gilles Deleuze ve Jacques Derrida’nın felsefelerinde öne 
sürdükleri yeni ilişkisellik ve toplumsallık biçimleri için Platoncu mimesis 
düşüncesinin eleştirisinin arz ettiği önemi göstermektir. Tartışma, bu ilişkiyi 
anlamak için, bu düşünürlerin edebiyat sorunsalına yaklaşımları üzerinden 
yürütülmektedir. Böylece, Deleuze ve Derrida’nın, öne sürdükleri toplumsallığın 
oluş ve “pharmakos” vurguları sayesinde, ideal bir vatandaşlık modeli 
oluşturulmasına ve toplumsallığın kökeninin doğal olandan politik olana 
doğrusal bir geçişte konumlandırılmasına getirdikleri eleştirilerle, toplumsallığa 
ilişkin geleneksel varsayımlardan ayrıldıkları noktalar tartışılmaktadır. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Mimesis, Simulakra, Platonizm, Edebiyat, Yasa, Oluş, 
Toplumsallık, Sözleşme 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis will evolve around three axes or series that will resonate with each 
other: mimesis, literature and sociality.  We will study how Deleuze and Derrida 
discuss literature and relate it to the question of sociality. This relationship 
between literature and sociality in Deleuze and Derrida’s thoughts will be 
presented with a detour to their criticism of Platonic mimesis.1  The political 
stakes of their reconsideration of Platonic philosophy will be discussed in the 
context of literature, as in both Deleuze and Derrida, the question of literature 
immediately links with the question of the political.   Hence, the focus of this 
thesis will be the interrelations between these three concepts, rather than how 
each of them has evolved in their respective course of study. We will not be 
examining how theories of mimesis, literary criticism or political philosophy 
have been studied historically, but by strolling along the borders of these 
concepts, we will try to discover the history of overlooking such interrelatedness. 
For this aim, we will delve into the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques 
Derrida, in order to point to a novel understanding of sociality in their individual 
ways of intertwining these series.  By way of this attempt, we will also be able to 
reformulate or displace particular questions guiding theories of mimesis, literary 
criticism and political philosophy which, in fact, will help us making the 
historical connection by this very rupture.   
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To study mimesis in the context of literature and sociality is by no means a 
suggestion to reduce the question of mimesis to literature, or the question of 
literature to sociality; to the contrary, the suggestion of this thesis is that it is 
rather more promising to study these terms before their conceptual closure so 
that we will be able to figure out how the questioning of each of these concepts 
immediately permeates with other questions, by reinvesting them with certain 
assumptions, be it ontological or epistemological. Plato, who is indeed renowned 
for his critical and prohibitive stance towards mimesis, does not take the 
question of mimesis as a simple concept either, but rather always interrogates it 
on the borders of art, politics and philosophy.  This is why, in Platonic works, we 
encounter many words in many contexts produced from the root mimos: 
mimesthai, mimesis, mimema, mimetes, and  mimetikos. (Gebauer&Wulf, p.27) 
The aspiration of Platonic philosophy is indeed to distinguish and control this 
very multiplicity of mimetic formations to avoid their unwanted effects. Hence, 
the relationship between a model and a copy cannot be taken simply as an 
artistic relationship, but rather is a question of law that subjects the copy to the 
governance of the model. In this way, the question of mimesis is linked with 
jurisprudence and politics as well.   
The argument of this thesis is that the question of sociality is closely related to 
the law and politics of resemblance.  Any theory of sociality inevitably requires a 
questioning of mimesis as to account for how sameness and differences relate  to 
each other in a social formation. This claim is best traceable in contractarian 
arguments of sociality where the State of Nature and the political society are 
separated by an event, namely the social contract. In the following chapters, 
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firstly, we will try to show how contractarian views of sociality operate on the 
basis of a society of similarity which is constituted by an ideal model of citizen.  
This model is assumed to be the law of society to which every individual in the 
society must conform in order to be eligible to take part in it and hence, they are 
ranked according to their degree of participation.  Secondly, we will suggest how 
this Platonic interpretation of law is reversed in Kantian philosophy since for 
Kant it is the good that follows the law and not the reverse.  Although this radical 
reversal of Kant is supposed to serve the self-sufficiency of law for its source of 
authority, we will show how it will be haunted by a dependency on the fictive 
nature of authority.  We will also focus on the problem of the passage from the 
natural to the political, be it a hypothetical or an actual passage that takes place 
in the past, and we will argue that the concept of democracy-to-come in Derrida 
and people-to-come in Deleuze puts an emphasis on futurity which abstains 
from such a linear passage.  
Given the aims of this thesis, it might still be unclear why I follow the thoughts 
of both Deleuze and Derrida together to argue for the conclusion of this thesis. 
First of all, the primary aim of this thesis is not to locate the differences and 
similarities between the thoughts of these thinkers who have written 
occasionally on similar topics. Instead, what we will do here, is to suggest that 
these thoughts or styles may work together in this particular context, namely, 
the social implications of their understanding of literature. What enables this co-
functioning is their emphasis on the future in their political reservations. For 
Derrida, since literature as an institution is the hyperbolique condition of 
democracy in that it is granted with an authority to say everything, it may be the 
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milieu of subversion of this given right: a particular appropriation or 
misappropriation of this authority in the creation of a non-response.  This 
particular use points to a future democracy, different from the present 
democracies of responding citizens whose responses are governed by truth.  For 
Deleuze, in a parallel argument, minor literature is a mode of writing in which 
individual concerns immediately connect with political ones as statements in 
literature are always collective assemblages of enunciations. This collectivity, 
nevertheless, is not the representation of an existing people, but instead 
fabulates or invokes a new people-to-come.  For Deleuze, writing is a process of 
becoming, and becoming always involves a “peopling”, a creation of new lives, 
new modes of relationalities.  As a process without an end or a reference point, 
the coming of the people is always a becoming that will never be exhausted in 
the temporality of the past-present-future. In both Deleuze and Derrida, we 
might recognize this radical futurity of sociality and hence, we will emphasize 
that this understanding of futurity is what criticizes the prevailing 
understanding of sociality where it is considered as an effect of an event that 
takes place in a hypothetical or an actual past.  A futurity that is not reduced to 
the accomplishment of certain present agenda, in other words, a futurity, not of 
future anterior, but rather the radical futurity of à venir or to-come.  In order to 
argue for the significance of this futurity, I will be employing the works of 
Deleuze and Derrida complementarily. In my opinion, the complementarity of 
Deleuze and Derrida might be elaborated via the complementarity of economy 
and finance.  
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We will employ the critique of Deleuze as an economical one, in the sense that it 
consists of agricultural activities (deterritorialization, rhizomatic unrooting), 
animal husbandry (becoming-animal) and industrial affairs (machines, 
production and function).  In this economical framework, by studying the 
allocation of resources and exchange within a philosophical system, Deleuze 
overturns the system of expenditure back upon itself which might be considered 
as a sort of bankruptcy. It is this by this misappropriation of resources within the 
economic activity that Deleuze points to the costs of an economic system as a 
whole, thereby pointing to the irreducible financial element in his thought. In 
this way, Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism might be considered as an 
economical activity in which Deleuze uses the resources of Platonic economy 
against itself to emancipate the simulacra from the law of resemblance.  
Our employment of Derrida’s thought within this complementarity will be a kind 
of financial analysis that focuses on the external resources, funds and debts due 
to which constitution of any statement becomes possible.  By this financial 
perspective, Derrida points to the exteriority of an interiority as the conditions of 
possibility and impossibility of such a demarcation.  By emphasizing the losses 
in the financial scheme of theoretical investments, Derrida offers a generalized 
writing which does not appropriate any loss as profit by incorporating it back to 
the theoretical localization. Such localizations, indeed, are the reiteration of a 
restricted economy which exhausts itself in its claim of exhausting the outside.  
Out of this vigilance to the outside, Derrida offers an economy, a general 
economy of writing and thinking. In this way, the complementarity of the 
economical perspective of Deleuze and the financial perspective of Derrida are 
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not two incompatible approaches, but rather this relationship should be thought 
within the general finance or general economy their thoughts themselves create.2  
It is this complementarity of perspectives that I wish to employ in the critique of 
sociality they undertake through their studies of literature by making a certain 
detour to the reconsideration of Platonic premises. 
We might briefly sketch the course of this quest by introducing how chapters 
proceed and interact.  In the first chapter, we will discuss Deleuze and Derrida’s 
reconsideration of Platonic philosophy.  In the first part, we will argue how 
Deleuze takes the Platonic thought from the point of the problem of accounting 
for differences, since according to the theory of Ideas, difference can only be 
considered as deviations explained by different levels of participation in the 
original Idea.  What the theory of forms suggests is, for Deleuze, the ultimate 
reduction of all differences to an originary identity or sameness.  By studying the 
movements of thinking across Platonic texts, Deleuze notices the peculiarity of 
Sophist in which Plato attempts to distinguish the genuine fake. In simulacra, 
Deleuze sees the power of the false to overturn Platonic thought within itself.  
However, Deleuzian thought is not limited to the criticism of Plato nor is the 
criticism of Plato limited to the concept of simulacra.  With Guattari, Deleuze 
offers rhizomatics to put forward their concept of multiplicity without making 
any recourse to the dialectics of One and many.  The concept of becoming stands 
for the lines of flight by which multiplicities open and connect to each other on 
the plane of rhizome.  This formulation of multiplicities does not disavow 
hierarchical connections since multiplicities involve lines of stratifications as 
well. Subjectivity follows such a line of stratification instead of the line of 
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deterritorialization of “haecceities”. The singularity of haecceities accompanies 
the removal of perceptions and affections from their subjective formations, 
opening them to affects and percepts that are extracted from their lived 
actualities, this removal being the task of the artist. It is in this sense, for 
Deleuze, that literature is always a matter of becoming, a passage of life which 
offers the traversing of both the lived and the livable.  “When one writes, the 
only question is which other machine the literary can be plugged into in order to 
work.” (2004, p.5)  When a becoming is undertaken through literature, it is not a 
voyage that takes places only literally, but rather it is a real process, as becoming 
produces nothing other than itself.  
Derrida’s occupation with Platonic thought, focusing on the question of the 
relationship between writing and speech, suggests how writing cannot be 
ascribed merely to an imitation of speech.  Writing is a pharmakon, a medicine 
and a poison at the same time, a copy of and an alternative to speech, where 
speech characterizes the living truth and the writing, dead myths.  Writing is 
marked with a debt to the speaker, the Father who ultimately gives life and 
controls the words.  If writing is underscored as it purports to the absence of the 
father, Derrida emphasizes the logic of supplementarity operating here in order 
to argue for how this orphanage of writing may enact a subversive replacement, 
according to which writing as a pharmakon is external yet at the same time has 
the power of affecting the living organism of speech internally.  What writing 
stands for is an illusion for the memory, since with writing one might easily 
confuse genuine memory and wisdom with the fake repetition of writing.  The 
supplementarity of writing is dangerous since it devoids us from the ability to 
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situate and distinguish certain claims as genuine or fake. In this way, 
pharmakon can be regarded as the condition of possibility of making such 
distinctions and the impossibility of sustaining them at the same time.  It points 
to an absence without which presence cannot present itself.  Pharmakos, for 
Derrida, as an absent element in Plato’s pharmaceutical chain of pharmakeia-
pharmakon-pharmakeus points to such a play of différance. Pharmakos, 
meaning wizard or scapegoat in Greek, stands for the citizen to be expelled for 
the well being of society since society is cured by the exclusion of this poisonous 
interior element.  In this way, the frail relationship between writing as the 
orphan and speech as the rule of the father is juxtaposed with the singular 
literary work before the law of literariness.  
In the second chapter, we will continue the path opened up by the criticism of 
Platonic philosophy.   With Deleuze, we will discuss how writing or literature 
points to a possibility of becoming-other through a non-mimetic process of 
involution.  Since becoming is always becoming-multiple according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, we will be discussing the becomings-pack through literature.  The 
becomings-other in writing is always accompanied by a becoming-other of 
language itself, and since literature is always a collective assemblage of 
enunciation rather than an exposition of individual statements, minor literature 
is granted the fabulative power of invoking a people-to-come. What we will be 
emphasizing in this chapter, is the fact that becomings involve a pact among two 
series, and it is by this pact that we will be able to study the people-to-come as a 
people who do not yet exist. We will try to understand what kind of alliance 
these pacts build up, with writings of Kafka, Melville and Sacher-Masoch.  
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The question of literature in Derrida’s thought is an engagement with the 
implications of the question “what is literature?”. Derrida argues that literature 
as an institution, by being allowed to say everything, creates the hyperbolique 
condition of democracy.  It points to a democracy-to-come when it exercises the 
possibility of using this right to say everything as a subversive instance of 
irresponsibility, contrary to the responsible citizens of present democracies who 
are obliged to respond, and respond by telling the truth.  For this aim, we are 
going to refer to one of the most interesting texts of Derrida in which he 
juxtaposes the question of literature with the question of law. By so doing, 
Derrida does not seek discuss narrativity as the essence of law, but rather he 
shows how narrativity of literature itself is determined by a similar process of 
litigation.  By a critical reading of Kantian moral imperative, Derrida reconsiders 
the inaccessibility of law not as the formal foundation of the good, but as the 
deferral of the law of différance.  This law avowing the necessary failure of giving 
an originary account of law, helps Derrida to argue for a singular relationship 
between the singular and the universal.  Bartleby’s delicate relationship with his 
community, his bizzare response stands as a rupture since it is through this non-
response that Bartleby is able to put into play a possibility of duplicating the law 
as a way of subversion.  
In the last chapter, following the social emphasis made in the second chapter, we 
will attempt to investigate what kind of sociality the people-to-come (Deleuze) 
and democracy-to-come (Derrida) imply. We have already seen that both 
Deleuzian and Derridean criticisms of Platonic mimesis employ sophists as a 
critical move. For Deleuze, as an attempt of isolating the genuine fake in Platonic 
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text, Sophis, gives us the possibility of overturning Platonism within itself.  As 
false pretenders, they pose a threat to the well being of Platonic society, as they 
devoid Plato the ability to make comfortable distinctions. Derrida, too, in order 
to show the logic of supplementarity operating in Platonic thought, adds the 
pharmakos(scapegoat) to the pharmaceutical chain of Plato. Sophists as the 
wizards or scapegoats of Platonic society are condemned to be expelled from the 
society, since they exert the danger of displacing Platonic classifications.  In this 
way, we will argue for a sociality in which the individual is not judged against a 
model of good citizenship and where society is not a molar coming together of 
individuals. Moreover, unlike the contractarian views of society which always 
assume a passage between the State of Nature and political society, the notions 
of people-to-come and democracy-to-come stand for the critique of such a 
passage. We will show that this futurity invoked by the term “to-come”, refers to 
an absolute past where no such originary passage would have occurred. Instead 
of following a social contract which stands for the good model of citizen that 
every individual in the society should resemble, and instead of the evolutionist 
anthropology which marks social progress as the centralization of society, 
Deleuze argues for a society of difference in which parties make contract only in 
order to create new-multiplicities following vectors of deterritorialization. 
Derridean thought emphasizes the impossibility of the social contract as a 
passage from the State of Nature to the political society where the constitution of 
an originary passage is forbidden by the law of différance.  
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2. RECONSIDERING PLATONIC MIMESIS 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss Deleuze’s and Derrida’s reconsiderations of 
Platonic thought on the axis of mimesis.  Formulated as such, it might seem, at 
first, that we are taking both Plato’s thought and its mimetic conceptualizations 
as obvious and their interrelation as simple. To the contrary, we will employ 
Deleuzian and Derridean thought, to reveal the economic and financial structure 
of the Platonic thought in its diverse investments in mimetic determinations.  
Contrary to the aim of contextualizing and defining what mimesis is, we will try 
to demonstrate how Deleuze and Derrida walk on the borders of mimesis, 
without reducing it to any artistic, literary or political framework. This is indeed 
the way Plato too has worked mimesis in many forms and contexts within the 
course of his philosophical contemplations. Plato’s employment of the concept of 
mimesis spans from politics to art, and the valorization of this concept is not 
homogenous between and within these texts and contexts.3 Thus, without 
reducing this diversity, what we are going to provide by Deleuzian and Derridean 
criticisms of Platonic thought is this multiplicity is ultimately controlled 
economically and financially.  
In the first part of the chapter, we will follow how Deleuze overturns Platonism 
back upon itself, by tracing the economic movements of Plato within the 
topology of Platonic thought.  It will be an attempt of reallocating the resources 
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of Platonic economy to make this economy consummate itself, rather than a 
revalorization of certain terms that would maintain this Platonic economy in all 
ways intact.  In the second part, we will elaborate Derrida’s inquiry into Plato’s 
pharmacy, as a financial investigation, in order to demonstrate the logic of 
supplementarity operating in the relationship between writing and speech in the 
mimetic construction of Plato.  With this logic of supplementarity, Derrida will 
argue for the undecidable position of writing, an outsider theratening the 
interior totality and the truthfulness of speech as if it operates within.  Following 
Derrida’s line of argument, we will see an unfinancializable debt to an outside 
that makes the Platonic classifications and determinations possible. But since 
this debt is never payable, it is a radical loss pointing to the impossibility of this 
system as well. 
What is made evident with this complementarity of financial and economic 
analyses is that the mechanisms and criteria of selections and decisions fail 
when they are pushed to the extreme. At this juncture, sophists turn out to be of 
crucial importance for both thinkers. For Deleuze, the downward movement of 
finding the genuine fake is the abyss of Platonic selection; it is the reason why 
they are continuously dismissed. For Derrida, the exclusion of the sophists is the 
exclusion of the pharmakon, the poison and the cure of society. As such, Plato’s 
understanding of mimesis is not just a philosophy on model and copy, but also a 
politics and jurisprudence of this relationship.  After elaborating on the former 
point, we will continue with its political and legal implications in the following 
chapters. 
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2. 1. Deleuze’s Overturning of Platonism 
In Difference and Repetition (1994) and The Logic of Sense (1990), Deleuze 
introduces and elaborates the concept of simulacrum which he takes on from 
Nietzschean assignment to future philosophers: to reverse the Platonic thought. 
Of course, such a project was not an undertaking unattempted before Deleuze or 
even before Nietzsche himself. Philosophies of Kant, Hegel or even Aristotle 
might be regarded as the pioneers of such a reversal according to their own 
respective styles. So we might ask: What is the point that distinguishes Deleuze’s 
reversal of Platonism from others. And why does Deleuze consider the 
destruction of Platonism “the most innocent of all destructions” (1990, p.266)? 
To begin with, Deleuze’s engagement with the propositions of Platonic thought 
about mimesis does not isolate the problem of mimesis in and of itself, putting it 
apart from other questions of Platonic thought. Thus Deleuze is interested both 
in the questions of Platonic philosophy and how the concept of mimesis is 
employed within the economy of these questions. According to this perspective, 
Plato’s theory of Ideas as the world of perfection to which the world of 
appearances may only approximate is not simply an attempt to demarcate the 
genuine, the good, the perfect but also an attempt to produce and justify the 
criteria to distinguish and categorize. As Daniel Smith suggests, “Plato’s 
singularity lies in a delicate operation of sorting or selection that precedes the 
discovery of Idea  [insofar as] the motivation of the theory of Ideas lies initially 
in the direction of a will to select, to sort out, to faire la difference (literally, “to 
make the difference”) between true and false images.” ( 2006, p. 91) Thus, the 
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ideal does not only consist in what is good, but it also provides us with the 
criteria of evaluation to select and distinguish the good from the bad, the better 
from the worse. It helps us to identify and eliminate the false rivals, the fake 
claimants. As Deleuze suggests: 
The one problem which recurs throughout Plato’s philosophy is 
the problem of measuring rivals and selecting claimants. This 
problem of distinguishing between things and their simulacra 
within a pseudo-genus or a large species presides over his 
classification of the arts and science… It is a dangerous trial 
without thread and without net, for according to ancient custom of 
myth and epic, false claimants must die (1994, p.60). 
 
This motif of rivalry permeating all Platonic texts is indeed a very important 
social element in the social and political life of the ancient Greeks. As Smith 
(2006) describes, the Athenian city is constructed with the royal palace in the 
middle, and the city is organized around a public center, the agora, which is in 
an equal distance from all citizens. The constitution of these cities, thus, pertains 
to an agonistic structure which is characterized by a competition of claims and 
powers of free men. This agonistic relationship applies to the philosophers of 
that time as well. These philosophers are thought to be claimants of truth, at an 
equal distance from it competing for the best approximation. If the philosophers 
claim to be the friend of wisdom, it ought to be determined who is the true friend 
and the genuine philosopher. Within such a spatium where rivalry is ensured by 
the right of claim given to everybody, it becomes a primary task to distinguish 
and separate these claimants in politics, in science as well as philosophy.   
In Platonic thought, in order to distinguish the authentic from the fake, the 
claimants are evaluated according to their participation in the eidos, in the Idea. 
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The participants are put in the hierarchy of resemblance, the higher being the 
most similar to the original identity of eidos. The comparison between  
pretenders relies on two similitudes: “the exemplary similitude of an original 
identity, and the imitative or “mimetic” similitude of a more or less similar copy” 
(Smith, 2006, p.97). Ideas as the preexisting foundation of all the resembling 
claimants, hence treat  difference only through the governance of the Same and 
according to the principle of resemblance. For Plato, the order of this similitude 
spans from the eidos, demiurge to the phantasm where the phantasm is only the 
simulacra, and its participation in the ideal is the minimum insofar as it is the 
furthest from the truth.  
The Sophist is an important instance in Plato’s thought which Deleuze (1990) 
carefully considers. If the primary interest of Plato is to provide well-founded 
divisions, Deleuze focuses on these strategies of dividing across Platonic texts, in 
particular in Statesmen (1995), Phaedrus (1977), and the Sophist (1993).  In 
Statesman, Plato attempts to distinguish the true claimant of governance from 
the false pretenders such as doctors or merchants who claim to be the shepherds 
of the men. Similarly, the theoretical aim of Phaedrus is to provide the criteria to 
distinguish the true love from inauthentic love. In order to reinforce his method 
of division, Plato employs myths. Although, these myths seem to interrupt the 
method of division, in the end, they unite with the criteria of selection as an 
integral element. On the other hand, when one reads Sophist, one can clearly 
observe that its theoretical strategy is quite different than the Phaedrus or the 
Statesmen which attempt to isolate and put forward the true lover or the true 
statesmen, trying to ascent towards the ideal. In Sophist, to the contrary, the 
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basic motive is to isolate the fake and to demonstrate the contradictions and the 
erroneousness of the sophist thought while descending towards the simulacral. 
In isolating the false, Plato does not need a model or myth, since in the case of 
Sophist, there is no need to distinguish the true sophist from its fake pretender: 
“since the true sophist himself the false claimant” (Smith, 2006, p. 98) This shift 
in the method of division becomes a necessity, since in Sophist, what concerns 
Plato is the being of the simulacrum and the demarcation of sophistry as such. 
According to Deleuze, 
[f]or this reason, it may be that the end of the Sophist contains the 
most extraordinary adventure of Platonism: as a consequence of 
searching in the direction of the simulacrum and of leaning over 
its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the 
simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in 
question the very notations of copy and model (1990, p.256). 
 
For Deleuze, such a definition will ultimately result in an undecidability between 
Socrates and the sophists. The reversal of Platonic thought is pointed for by 
Plato himself in the inscription of this undecidability. Now we can better 
recognize that the distinction between the world of ideas and the world of 
appearances is not the true Platonic distinction on which his thought operates. 
The profound distinction takes place between the claimants, the copies and the 
simulacra. Copies are defined by their ascension towards the ideal insofar as 
they have an internal resemblance to the original identity of the eidos. 
Simulacra, on the other hand, are constituted upon a disparity which is defined 
by a descent from the truth of ideals. Thus, the world of the idea does not serve 
only to constitute an opposition to the world of appearances, but more 
importantly, in doing so, it guarantees the justification of another distinction 
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between the true images and false ones. Thus, as Smith (2006) suggests, the real 
conviction of the condemnation of the simulacra is the displacement it summons 
forth between the model and copy, and that, by doing so, deprives us of the 
genuine transcendental rules whereby the world is judged. Platonic geometry of 
classification is a transcendental model that exerts itself onto the things in terms 
of likenesses. Hence, the Deleuzian project of reversing Platonism takes this 
displacement brought forth by simulacra and affirms it for an immanent 
philosophy of the world in contrast to Platonic thought which disavows such a 
movement by conjoining simulacra to the hinges of copy as being the copy of the 
copy. This affirmation of the simulacra as such is the affirmation of the 
difference without being mediated or governed by the originarity of sameness. 
Thus, the critique of Platonism, for Deleuze, accounts for the differences in an 
immanent philosophy where difference is recognized as difference as such.   
According to Deleuze, simulacrum is without resemblance in contrast to the 
copy which has an internalized resemblance. An image without resemblance is 
deprived of any resemblance but sustains itself as an image. Thus, its 
relationship might be better described as a semblance by which the resemblance 
is sustained only as an external element of that image.  By externalizing the 
resemblance, simulacrum becomes dangerous not because it is the opposite of 
the originary resemblance, but rather because this exact semblance is 
indistinguishable from the internalized resemblance of good copies. Smith 
(2006) explains the displacement of the semblance by Christian demonology. 
The evil or the peril of the Satan or the demonic is not simply that they oppose to 
that which is divine, but that in creating a perfect semblance, they deprive us of 
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the ability to differentiate between the two.  The internalized difference is thus 
not a move to prioritize the false over the true, but undermines categories by 
which we judge things as true and false. As such the falsity of the simulacrum is 
deprived of any true model for comparison, and gets affirmed by its power: the 
Nietzschean power of the false. 
Deleuze clarifies the radical transformation of the simulacra by two distinct 
views of the world: “only that which resembles differs” and “only that which 
differs resembles” (1990, p.261). Evidently, the first view refers to the Platonic 
account of difference in which difference is the counter effect of an unsuccessful 
similarity. The second, on the other hand, is the world of simulacra in which 
things internalize difference, and resemblance and identity may arise out only as 
effects. Therefore, simulacrum is not marked by its disavowal of resemblance or 
identity. It renounces the idea that difference is only possible under a 
transcendent criterion according to which things are judged and hierarchies are 
established. Furthermore, this displacement does not propose a new 
transcendental ground for a selection and judgment. Simulacrum, Deleuze 
suggests, 
harbors a positive power which denies the original and the copy, 
the model and the reproduction. At least two divergent series are 
internalized in the simulacrum- neither as the original, neither as 
the copy. … The same and the similar no longer have an essence 
except as simulated, that is as expressing the functioning of the 
simulacrum (1990, p.262). 
 
The reversal of Platonism has a peculiar relationship with Platonic thought in 
that it already proceeds through a way Plato himself pointed to insofar as what 
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Deleuze does is to take the prospects of the Platonic project to its extreme. For 
Deleuze, that “the overturning [of Platonism] should conserve many Platonic 
characteristics is not only inevitable, but desirable” (1994, p.59). This 
overturning is not a reversal that reinscribes Platonic transcendentality anew, 
but rather affirming the power of simulacra, it proposes a philosophy of 
immanence in which “the different relates to the different by difference itself” 
(p.299). 
This immanent philosophy also implies drastic changes for the Platonic 
conception of repetition. Platonism offers a repetition which repeats the 
originary and the same in every instance of repetition. Thus every repetition is 
marked by its attendance to the original within. According to Deleuze, on the 
contrary, the variations of repetition do not make any recourse to a premier 
model. Each element in the series, including the first, is regarded as an element 
of the series which does not govern other repetitions. Thus, instead of a fixed 
essence being repeated in the series, Deleuze argues for an essence which is not 
merely marked by its difference to other essences, but also by its difference to 
itself as well. “ There is not an originary “thing” (model) which could eventually 
be uncovered behind the disguises, displacements, and illusions of repetition 
(copies); rather, disguise  and displacement are the essence of repetition itself, 
which is in itself an original and positive principle” (Smith, 2006, p. 112). 
The overturning of Platonism and affirmation of the simulacra has been of great 
significance in Deleuzian thought for it to posit itself as a philosophy difference 
and immanence. However, despite this significance, we should note that Deleuze 
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has abandoned using this term in his later works. In 1993, he writes, “It seems to 
me that I have completely abandoned the notion of the simulacrum” (qtd. in 
Smith, 2006, p.116). Of course, we would not expect Deleuzian thought to stick 
to a few concepts while announcing the rigorous task of philosophy as the 
creation of concepts. Still, we should be aware of this theoretical move in 
Deleuzian thought, in order to have a better grasp of certain concepts Deleuze 
has favored in his later books such as “becoming” and “assemblage”.  
According to Smith (2006), we might mention two reasons for this shift in 
terminology. Firstly, the critical use of the concept of simulacra is limited to the 
context of Platonic thought in which things are assumed to simulate a 
transcendental ideal. However, Deleuzian philosophy of event considers the 
world not as a process of simulation but as an actualization. Clearly, the concept 
of simulacrum hardly informs us about such a view of events, hence Deleuze 
prefers assemblage to simulacrum and actualization to the process of simulation 
in his later texts. Secondly, the philosophers Deleuze was primarily interested in 
were the thinkers of the XVII. century about whom he has written in his later 
works. The thoughts of Spinoza and Leibniz, for instance, are sustained more 
steadily throughout his works insofar as Deleuze does not limit the scope of his 
critique to a constant relationship with ancient thought. Thus, the Platonic 
critique constitutes only an introductory sketch of the path Deleuzian thought 
will be strolling through.  
The abandoning of the concept of simulacrum, nevertheless, does not mean that 
Deleuze abandoned what he had proposed regarding the operations of 
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representation, repetition and copying, but rather that he started to discuss it in 
a new context and in a new concept which connects with other philosophical 
questions. In A Thousand Plateaus, in which Deleuze and Guattari (2004) has 
collaborated, the rhizomatic thought they have proposed has underlined the 
unexpected and proliferating connections in rhizomatic structures, contrary to 
arborescent formations in which diversity and plurality is always controlled and 
located. In order to avoid the economy of the One and many, which always 
returns to the unity and priority of the One, Deleuze and Guattari propose the 
concept of multiplicities. Multiplicities consist of determinations, magnitudes or 
dimensions in the alteration of which other multiplicities get constituted. These 
multiplicities are not closed on themselves put open to one another; they “are 
defined by the outside” (2004, p.9), that is by how they create new lines of flight 
in order to link with other multiplicities. Assemblage refers to the expansion of 
the multiplicities by coming together with others via lines of flight.  We may talk 
of arborescent multiplicities as well as rhizomatic multiplicities, and these do 
not oppose each other. The immanent process of rhizome includes “knots of 
arborescence” yet the arborescent organization always engenders its own 
escapes. For Deleuze and Guattari, dualisms are necessary enemies, “furniture 
we are forever rearranging” (2004, p.23).  Every multiplicity consists of only 
lines, but not only of lines of deterritorialization, but also of lines of 
stratification. In the plane of rhizome, becoming refers to the endless process of 
connecting multiplicities, a line of difference, a clinamen that comes before any 
individual points.   
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Deleuze and Guattari show that Strauss’s Totemism relies on the model of 
proportionality which attempts to understand the institution of totem. This 
model of proportionality is different from the model of resemblance, since it 
works by a structure as the basis of correspondence between terms.  In this 
structural model, resemblance is not between items or units, but between 
relations; it is  a mimetic relationship that structures different relationships 
according to a model. Becoming cannot be explained by these relations of 
correspondence, resemblance or identification. All the more, it is not imaginary. 
It is a real process, not in the sense that becoming-wolf means turning into a 
wolf because wolf is an element through which becoming passes. Becoming-
child, becoming-woman or becoming-molecular, becoming-vegetable are not 
movements to be terminated upon arrival of a certain station of being, but rather 
is a voyage without a destination.  Becoming is real, because it “produces 
nothing other than itself” (2004, p.262).  
We should emphasize one more aspect of becoming which indeed is implied by 
other ones.  “A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a 
peopling, in short, a multiplicity” (2004, p.264).  In “1914: One or several 
wolves”, Deleuze and Guattari discuss Freud’s article titled “Unconscious”, 
written in 1915, where Freud discusses the difference between the neurosis and 
psychosis. Such a difference is explained by Freud by always making recourse to 
a unity, the unity of words and things, in the case of neurotic and psychotic 
comparisons respectively. This unity which Freud zealously tries to maintain, 
Deleuze and Guattari stresses, is the unity of the Signifier, the unity of which 
“replaces multiplicities with the dismal unity of an object declared lost” (2004, 
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p.31). This interest of Freud prevails in his study and treatment of Wolf-Man as 
well. The pack of wolves the Wolf-Man sees in his dream is restored back to the 
familial relationships under the despotism of the Father.  However, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, this is stupid since “you can’t be one wolf, you’re always 
eight or nine, six or seven” (2004, p.32). Freud always underscores the multiple 
element of the unconscious, its crowd. Wolf stands here as an intensity, a band 
his body is passing through to join this pack. Wolf, in fact, here refers to a 
wolfing. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
…the proliferation of [wolves,] rats, the pack, brings a becoming-
molecular that undermines the great molar powers of family, 
career and conjugality; there is a sinister choice since there is a 
“favorite” in the pack with which a kind of contract or alliance, a 
hideous pact, is made; there is the institution of an assemblage, a 
war machine or criminal machine… (2004, p.257) 
 
With the above quotation, we configure the other party of the hideous alliance of 
becoming. It is a “favorite” among other multiplicities that one comes together  
with in order to constitute a war-machine.  It is the demon of the pack with 
whom one instigates a dangerous affinity. Deleuze and Guattari call this demon 
the Anomalous. It is this anomalous that functions as a border, the borderline of 
a multiplicity that should be passed beyond in order to reach the other pack. It is 
a peripheral position that one cannot definitely be sure whether to include it in 
the pack or not.  Yet, we should emphasize that the relationship between 
contracting parties is never a relation of imitation. It is a double 
deterritorialization, a double becoming so that “that which one becomes 
becomes no less than the one that becomes” (2004, p.336). It is an “aparallel 
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evolution of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other” 
(2004, p.11). 
To better explain this aparallel evolution, we should explain the Spinozist 
conception of body of Deleuze and Guattari. According to this view, the body is 
not defined by what it is, or what organs it consists of, but rather in terms of 
longitudes – “extensive parts falling under a relation” and latitudes-“intensive 
parts falling under a capacity” (2004, p.283). As such, the body is not defined 
from the point of a biological genus either, but rather by its power of affecting 
and being affected, in other words, in terms of what it can do. The kinetic 
relationship of movement and rest, speed and slowness constitute the fiber 
among bodies. In other words, bodies are defined by their power to become, this 
power being the kinetic relations of intensities for a particular arrangement.  We 
may redefine becoming in terms of this new conception of the body: “starting 
from the one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the function one 
fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes the 
relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one 
is becoming, and through which one becomes” (2004, p.300).  Hence, this novel 
conception of the body does not stand in a dualistic opposition to the 
individuality of the subject and organism, but rather manifests haecceities as the 
manner which we talk about the individuality of a climate or fog, still containing 
a minimum of strata of subjectivity to instigate deterritorialization.  
Becoming-dog, for instance, does not refer to an attempt to resemble a dog by 
imitating particular traits of a dog: one need not bark. It rather involves making 
 25
one’s organism “enter into composition with something else in such a way that 
the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a 
function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity, into 
which they enter” (2004, p. 302). Barking, still, is not an obstacle for such a 
proximity but should accompany the canine kinetics of the body.  Here, the dog 
constitutes the borderline of another multiplicity in order to join the dog pack.  
In this way, becoming always involves a becoming-pack by rhizomatic 
connections to other multiplicities. Defined as such, this body can hardly be 
counted as a subject since it operates in the domain of affects and percepts 
rather than affections and perceptions of humane relationality.  
The significance of arts, painting, cinema and literature, for Deleuze, lies in the 
fact that they give a life to the affects and percepts. “Life alone creates such zones 
where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in 
its enterprise of co-creation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996, p.173). Affects- “non 
human becomings of man” and percepts- “nonhuman landscapes of nature” is 
extracted from lived affections and perceptions with the quest of the painter, 
musician or writer, each in their respective materials and styles.  
We have begun this chapter by discussing Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism. 
The notion of simulacra has played a major role in this undertaking, but looking 
at the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, we see that this term is not sufficient to 
account for Deleuze’s thought as a philosophy of difference or becoming. The 
question of becoming continues the project of overturning Platonism in a 
particular way; it is a movement against ‘to be’, against stationary points upon 
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which Plato tried to establish the society, society of identicalities. The Platonic 
renouncement of mimesis on the grounds that it strips us from the criteria to 
distinguish the genuine from the fake is replaced by another renunciation of 
mimesis, but this time on the grounds that it restores the movement back to the 
identical, as a rupture of the flux of becoming.  We have emphasized what 
becoming ‘is not’ rather than what it ‘is’, because the outcome of aparallel 
evolution is not a fixed horizon, but rather a permanent deterritorialization of 
unity and identity. In order to explain the non-mimetic process of becoming, we 
have explained how bodies are defined by their power of affecting and being 
affected. We have also showed that becoming is always a question of population 
and peopling because it is directed towards new alliances within new packs. 
In the next chapter, we will focus on the ways literature extracts these affects 
and percepts to point to a life that is beyond the lived and the livable. For 
Deleuze, writing and becoming are inseparable since writing as a passage of life 
is without beginning nor end, and in this advent, one becomes-animal, woman, 
plant or imperceptible. As becoming involves an alliance, a peopling, literature 
also is a collective assemblage of enunciation although it is written by a single 
author or uttered by a single character. The new life embodied in literary works 
points to a new people, a new society, a new relationality. We will use these new 
forms of pacts and relationalities invented within literary works to provide a 
critique of the traditional view of society and sociality in which society is a body 
defined by its totality and closure.  
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However, before discussing Deleuze’s thoughts on literature, we will continue 
with another style of criticism of Platonic thought. Along with Deleuze’s 
treatment of Platonic philosophy, Derrida’s reading of Plato will be of crucial 
importance for the following chapters because it will re-inscribe the play of 
différance into Platonic mimesis governed by the truth of memory, sun and 
Father. 
2. 2. Derrida’s account of Platonism 
Derrida’s consideration of Plato’s philosophy is multifarious and multilayered. 
He does not reduce it to a certain homogeneous discourse but rather attempts to 
reread and even to retranslate Plato’s concepts and provisions in order to 
comprehend the Platonic moves within his complex topology. This attempt 
occupies an important place in Dissemination (2004), which discusses the 
Platonic account of the relationship between speech and writing in the first part 
entitled “Plato’s Pharmacy”. In the second part of the book, Derrida goes on with 
his criticism of Plato in “Double Session” where Mallarméan mimesis is 
investigated in comparison with Platonic provisions on the same subject. In 
Plato’s Pharmacy, Derrida mainly focuses on Plato’s Phaedrus, in which two 
characters, namely Socrates and Phaedrus, undertake a dialogue about a speech 
given by sophist Lysias on love. Yet, within the course of the dialogue, Socrates 
also mentions the relationship between speech and writing where he refers to 
the myth of Theuth and his presentation of his invention, namely writing, to the 
king. The consideration of this myth and its relation to Greek thought occupies 
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an important place in Derrida’s evaluation of the Platonic text. We shall quote 
Socrates’s recitation of this myth with Derrida’s remarks in parentheses: 
… I heard, then, that at Naucratis in Egypt there lived one of the 
old gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the 
ibis; and the name of the divinity was Theuth. It was he who first 
invented numbers and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not 
to speak draughts and dice, and above all writing (grammata). 
Now the king of all Egypt at the time was Thamus who lived in the 
great city of the upper region which the Greeks call the Egyptian 
Thebes; the god himself they call Ammon. Theuth came to him and 
exhibited his arts and declared that they should be imparted to 
other Egyptians. And Thamus questioned of the usefulness of each 
one; and Theuth enumerated, the King blamed or praised what he 
thought were the good or bad points in the explanation. Now 
Thamus I said to have a good deal to remark on both sides of the 
question about every single art (it would take too long to repeat 
here); but when it came to writing Theuth said, “This discipline (to 
mathēma), my King, will make the Egyptians wiser and will 
improve their memories (sophōterous kai mnēmonikōterous): my 
invention is a recipe (pharmakon) for both memory and wisdom. 
(qtd. in Derrida, 2004, p.80) 
 
Derrida, in the first instance, prefers to consider the context of this presentation, 
before paying attention to the response provided by the King. In this recitation 
of the presentation of Phaedrus, writing is put into a parallelism with drugs 
(pharmakon) which cures and aides the citizens to improve their memories. 
Writing, as a pharmakon, is portrayed as a beneficiary add-in to the general 
well-being of the society. Derrida’s moment of intervention to this recitation is 
the very moment of the presenting of writing as pharmakon. In fact, pharmakon 
also means “poison” in Greek, and this second meaning is also employed 
throughout Platonic texts. Here, the importance of the translation becomes 
evident, not only because it points to a certain difficulty of translation between 
two languages without removing the play of undecidability of a particular word, 
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but also because the removal of undecidability and the determination and 
fixation of a meaning is indeed the philosophical problem of deciding. This 
problem of deciding is the very issue at stake in the passage from non-
philosophy to the philosophy.  
Writing as a pharmakon is characterized by its forcing one to take leave from 
one’s habits, regular laws. For Derrida, such a taking leave is clearly 
demonstrated in Phaedrus, since it is this book that Phaedrus carries which 
makes Socrates go with him for a walk: “The leaves of writing act as a 
pharmakon to push or attract out of city the one who never wanted to get out, 
even at the end, to escape the hemlock” (2004, p.76). Socrates would clearly not 
be attending to the stroll, were the text was delivered in speech and not 
“deferred, reserved, enveloped, rolled up” in writing. What is to be underlined 
here is that, even before Socrates coins the term pharmakon for writing in the 
course of their dialogue, this logic of pharmakon operates as the motor of several 
other distinctions put forth by Socrates: books are presented as dead knowledge 
whereas speech is associated with the living knowledge. This liveliness and death 
pertain to the distinction between the myth and truth or pharmakon and 
medicine. 
The stage where Theuth presents writing to the King also informs about the 
power relations operating in this presentation. Theuth presents his invention to 
the King for his evaluation and acceptance.  Writing is assumed to bear no value 
before the King evaluates it, the King who himself indeed does not know 
anything about this novel invention. In fact, as a God, he is not supposed to feel 
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the lack of such a skill; he is satisfied with what his speech enables him: “he has 
no need to write” (2004, p.81). Theuth presents his invention to this supreme 
authority, a supervisor who will appreciate its value accordingly. As a supreme 
authority in control of his own speech, the King is also a father and his 
relationship to his son, that is to his logos, is compared and evaluated according 
to the writing as a son which has no father. 
Logos is a son, then, a son that would be destroyed in his very 
presence without the present attendance of his father. His father 
who answers. His father who speaks for him and answers for him. 
Without his father, he would be nothing but, in fact, writing. … The 
specifity of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence 
of the father. (2004, p.82) 
 
In Plato, the absence of the father of writing already makes writing half dead 
with respect to the lively speech which has its father behind, always maintaining 
the logos by his presence. For Plato, lively speech is indeed a living organism, 
with its own head and tail. It is a zoological body whose life is sustained by its 
indebtedness to the father. This debt marks the speech as the representative of 
the speaker. It is further underlined by Derrida that patēr, the Greek word for 
father, also stands for the Chief, the Capital and the Good(s). Thus the 
investment of this father-son dialectic goes beyond the spectrum of an 
orphanage.  
On the other hand, the distance between the son and the father in the orphanage 
of writing, according to Derrida, opens up the very possibility of autonomy and 
sufficiency. This orphanage becomes something desirable for its “patricidal 
subversion”. Through the parallelism between the Egyptian myth of Thoth and 
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Plato’s way of reciting the myth, we are not only in the domain of how cultures 
and mythologies interact, but also of that which made this interaction possible, 
namely, the supposed relationship between myths and philosophy: “Of a history-
or rather, of History- which has been produced in its entirety in the 
philosophical difference between mythos and logos …” (2004, p.91).  This 
History, in the relationship between Thoth and Ra, is reinscribed since the 
relationship between the god of death and the god of life is not only a relation of 
opposition, but of supplementarity as well. Thoth is the nocturnal representative 
of Ra. 
Thoth extends or opposes by repeating and replacing. By the same 
token, the figure of Thoth takes shape and takes its shape from the 
very thing it resists and substitutes for. … In distinguishing himself 
from his opposite, Thoth imitates it, becomes its sign and 
representative, obeys it and conforms to it, replaces it, by violence 
if need be. He is thus the father’s other, the father, and the 
subversive movement of replacement. The god of writing is thus at 
once his father, his son, and himself. (Derrida, 2004, p.96) 
 
Translating or determining pharmakon as remedy has further implications. We 
have already noted that its translation as remedy obliterated the ambivalence of 
the effect of the drug on the organism.  Still, the inspiration for such an 
obliteration relies on the words of the King, since we infer what Theuth has said 
from the King’s response. Such a translation already accepts the sovereignty of 
the dictations of the King and relies on his logic of distinctions.  
Plato is also dubious about the value of pharmakon as a remedy. He does not 
take its beneficiary effects for granted. Any beneficiary effects would not 
guarantee the absence of any other harmful effects. Furthermore, pharmakon is 
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always something external to the living organism; it is an artificial intervention.  
As an external enterprise, pharmakon is considered as a threat to the living 
organism. The threat of pharmakon, due to its alien and external nature 
indicates how disease is defined. Within this perspective, disease is that which 
comes from the outside of the organism. Pharmakon’s ambivalent status is thus 
confirmed by its externality; it might aggravate the illness instead of alleviating 
it. The health of a living organism, thus, depends on having no relationship at all 
with an outside. 
Now we can listen to the King’s response to Theuth, even if we had much of it 
because of the determination of writing in Theuth’s presentation as a remedy. 
… the King said, “ Theuth, my master of arts (Ō tekhnikōtate 
Theuth), to one man it is given to create the elements of an art, to 
another to judge the extent of harm and usefulness it would have 
for those who are going to employ it. And now, since you are the 
father of written letters (patēr ōn grammatōn), your paternal 
goodwill has led you to pronounce the very opposite (tounantion) 
of what is their real power. The fact is that this invention will 
produce forgetfulness in the souls of who has learned it because 
they will not need to exercise their memories (lēthēn men en 
psuchais parexei mnēmēs ameletēsiai), being able to rely on what 
is written, using the stimulus of external marks that are alien to 
themselves (dia pistin graphēs exōthen hup’ allotriōn tupōn) 
rather than, from within, their own unaided powers to call things 
to mind (ouk endothen autous huph’ hautoōn 
anamimnēskomeneus). So it is not a remedy for memory, but for 
reminding, that you have discovered (oukoun mnēmēs, alla 
hupomnēseōs, pharmakon hēures). And as for wisdom (sophias 
de), you’re equipping your pupils with only a semblance (doxan) of 
it, not with truth (alētheian). Thanks to you and your invention, 
your pupils will be widely read without benefit of a teacher’s 
instruction; in consequence, they will entertain the delusion that 
they have wide knowledge, while they are, in fact, for the most part 
incapable of real judgment. They will also be difficult to get on 
with since they will be men filled with the conceit of wisdom 
(doxosophoi), not men of wisdom (antisophon).” (qtd. in Derrida, 
2004, p.104-105) 
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This royal sentence emphasizes that the appearances writing creates are to be 
easily mistaken for the truth it conceals. What keeps Theuth from distinguishing 
between these false appearances and the truth is his paternal good will. It is 
supposed to produce just the semblance of real knowledge and wisdom, but 
actually it deprives the ones who employ it from the genuine exercise of memory. 
Derrida points to another feature of this response: the response builds itself out 
of a series of oppositions of which ‘appearance and truth’ counts as only one of 
them. Oppositions such as good and evil, inside and outside, true and false, 
pseudo and genuine are all clear cut distinctions the King makes in order to 
subject the ambivalence of writing to his governance. The operation of such an 
oppositional logic should not be underestimated. These oppositions, for Derrida, 
not only assume that each side of the opposition mutually excludes the other, 
but also that the series of opposition relies on one of the oppositions included 
within the series making the creation of such an externality possible. The 
importance of pharmakon lies in its undecidability as it is not comprehensible 
within this oppositional logic while at the same time providing us with the 
possibility of talking about such oppositions. It is that which makes this 
oppositional logic work without being subsumable “within what it situates.” This 
ghostly excess is not simply passing beyond the series, but rather is a 
displacement of them. 
As his reply suggests, another reason why the King disavows writing is its 
supposed undermining of memory. Writing, for the King, constitutes an 
alternative memory for the reader, and such an alternative memory would 
hinder the exercise of genuine memory. Writing turns out to be an impairment 
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of the memory, instead of reinforcing it. Within this line of thought, there is a 
clear correlation between memory and truth. The forgetfulness entailed by 
writing undermines knowledge; hence the man of writing can only be called a 
fake wise man.  
This figure of the fake wise man, for Plato, corresponds to the sophists who only 
seem to know, yet do not possess any genuine knowledge. On the other hand, 
sophists are known for their improved mnemonics, their outstanding ability to 
memorize. This ability is also acknowledged by Socrates in several dialogues: “I 
am sorry I quite forget about your mnemonic art” (qtd. in Derrida, 2004, p. 110). 
According to Plato, the mnemonics of the sophists does not rely on memory, but 
in monuments, inventories and copies; it concerns “not memory, but 
memorials.” Thus, sophists are considered pretenders in their mnemonic 
exercise as well. The memory Plato seeks is a memory without supplements, 
surrogates, without pharmakon, whereas writing is only capable of miming the 
genuine knowledge. Here, one should underline that Derrida’s consideration of 
the sophists along with the Platonic texts does not offer an affirmation of the 
sophist thought as such. Rather, it clearly demonstrates that, with an 
appropriative decision, Platonism and sophistry is distinguished by a line across 
which they “exchange their respective places, imitating the forms and borrowing 
the paths of the opponent” (2004, p.110).  
Here the critical question is “why is the surrogate or supplement dangerous?” 
This danger does not refer to a particular situation of the supplement, but rather 
to its ultimate nonsituatability within the binarism of absence and presence. The 
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nonsituatability of the supplement opens up a series of supplementarities by 
which writing, albeit something external to memory, is endowed with the 
capacity of affecting it. It is something external to memory but not to the extent 
of being unable to penetrate it. Thus, “the pharmakon is that dangerous 
supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked to do without it 
yet lets itself at once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced, completely 
by the very trace through which the present increases itself in the act of 
disappearing” (2004, p.113). This double operation ascribed to pharmakon, 
similar to the operation in thoughts of Saussure and Rousseau, is there to 
maintain both its exteriority and its power of affecting the memory. According to 
Derrida, such a move is successfully described by the “kettle-logic” which Freud 
employs to illustrate the logic of dreams. According to this contradictory logic, 
writing is external and inferior to the living memory which is unaffected by 
writing, and writing is harmful to the memory because it is a surrogate of it, and 
if one writes, it is just because the living memory is finite, meaning, memory is 
already damaged before writing has any impact on it; thus writing does not have 
an impact on memory. The oppositions exteriority/interiority, inferiority/ 
superiority, finitude/infinitude, genuine/surrogate are appropriated to secure a 
superior position for writing and an inferior one for its surrogate, but this 
attempt to determine only confirms a contradictory logic by which these 
distinctions cannot be successfully sustained.  
Both memory and its supplement involve a particular logic of repetition. In 
memory, truth is supposed to be repeated whereas in writing, the repeater is 
repeated in his absence. Yet, for Derrida, these two repetitions which count as 
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the distinction between Platonism and sophistry are like sides of a leaf 
suggesting an inseparability in its recto and verso. Therefore, the danger of the 
supplement arises out of its lack of essence, of fixed identity, and of 
characteristics proper to it. It is the atopos which constitutes the topos of 
opposition, “the différance of difference.” Pharmakon creates the possibility of 
dialectical philosophy, but only as an excess whose reservations can neither be 
exhausted nor eliminated by philosophical concepts. 
If pharmakon is what displaces and constitutes the binarism between absence 
and presence, Derrida re-reads the Platonic text not as a text closed upon itself 
but in order to comprehend what it leaves out in this attempt of closure. The 
presence of the pharmaceutical chain pharmakeia-pharmakon-pharmakeus in 
Platonic texts is sustained by a word which Derrida adds to this chain as a 
supplement: pharmakos. Pharmakos, meaning both wizard and scapegoat, 
denotes the very movement of excluding people from the city in ancient Greece. 
Thus pharmakos is the illness of the society and its cure at the same time. It is 
something inside but affects the society as an outsider. Thus the absence of the 
pharmakos in the pharmaceutical chain of Plato is an exclusion which becomes 
the present condition of the possibility of the distinctions and determinations 
suggested by Plato. It is what makes the framing a text possible, but at the same 
time, without being exhausted by the border, it constitutes the impossibility of 
framing. 
The opposition between the genuine repetition of truth by the living memory 
and the fake repetition of the repetition by pretenders is not only a distinction 
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made to sort out the genuine truth. The repetition of the carpenter, the 
repetition of the painter, and the repetition of writing are classified according to 
their involvement in the eidos. Their fake claims concerning their ability to 
present the living memory or organism makes these operations of repetition 
akin to each other. The painter or the sculptor has a living model, just as the 
carpenter repeats the genuine eidos; in a a parallel way, writing is supposed to 
have its living model, speech, whose liveliness it attempts to simulate. As 
Derrida suggests, if we are to include writing in the Platonic hierarchy of 
repetitions, it would come after all other three, the God, the carpenter and the 
painter, because its relationship with the model is not sustained in the repetition 
it provides; writing does not provide any image of the thing it represents, 
contrary to all other three forms of repetition which sustain such an affinity with 
the model to some extent. Thus if the painter produces phantasm, the copy of 
the copy, writing comes after painting in that it is not even capable of producing 
phantasm. So we might assert that writing does not imitate, but such an 
assertion clearly relies on the perfect imitation writing provides.  
[Writing is] what imitates it [voice] perfectly because it no longer 
imitates it at all. For imitation affirms and sharpens its essence in 
effacing itself. Its essence is its nonessence. And no dialectic can 
encompass this self-inadequation. A perfect imitation is no longer 
an imitation. If one eliminates the tiny difference that, in 
separating the imitator from the imitated, by that very fact refers 
to it, one would render the imitator absolutely different: the 
imitator would become another being no longer referring to the 
imitated. … It is only good insofar as it is bad. … [M]imēsis is akin 
to the pharmakon. No “logic,” no “dialectic,” can consume its 
reserve even though each must endlessly draw on it and seek 
reassurance through it (Derrida, 2004, p. 104). 
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There is a distance between the imitator and the imitated which makes imitation 
possible. This play of distance is renounced and announced at once, since 
Platonic hierarchy of repetition considers distance as being remote from the 
truth and thus disavows it. On the other hand for Derrida, this distance is a 
distancing by which truth can announce itself as such. By an affirmative move, 
Derrida considers this distance from truth, father, good, sun, capital, eidos as a 
chance to demonstrate the distancing without any attempt to consummate it. 
Thus, the writing Derrida affirms is not a writing that is in opposition to speech, 
but rather a generalized writing which is the very possibility of identification of 
speech as speech and writing as writing and the very possibility of their 
differentiation. Writing as a supplement to the genuine truth of living memory is 
a pharmakon, a pharmakos which imitates the eidos. The undecidable logic of 
mimesis is what makes imitation possible, but, at the same time, thanks to an 
unsubsumable reserve, it elicits a non-referral, by which writing does not write 
speech, but writes itself according to a “graphics of supplementarity”. What this 
graphic of supplementarity implies is, contrary to Plato’s designation of writing 
as the representative of speech, a mode of writing which Derrida calls general 
writing according to which neither speech nor writing can be thought as outside: 
“There is nothing outside of the text” (1976, p.178). 
Derrida’s reconsideration of Platonic mimesis in the light of this logic of 
supplementarity is one of the main concerns of the “The Double Session”. To 
point to the Mallarméan operation, Derrida, in this article, outlines the logic of 
mimesis and how it is founded thanks to a series of oppositions which results in 
degrading the simulacrum as the copy of the copy.  Mimēsis, similar to the 
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pharmakon, is both something without value as it gains its value from the model 
it imitates and something of degraded value because it is worth nothing in itself.   
“The Double Session” is a long meticulous reading of a short text written by 
Mallarmé: “Mimique”. Mallarmé’s text is about a scene of imitation which stages 
a mime who performs an imitation without imitating anything. This imitation 
without an imitated has neither prior referent nor prescription to follow. This 
staging without an anterior reality sustains its operation by way of a reference to 
another text, “Pierrot Murderer of His Wife”. The text of Mallarmé, Derrida 
suggests, consists in a double movement of referencing and self-referencing at 
the same time. This simultaneity is what makes the structure of text a play 
between its closing on itself and opening again. This self reference is crucial 
since it is the very production of the gap between the text and itself which 
creates a double which makes referencing and self-referencing possible.  
Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé along with the Platonic mimesis proceeds as an 
interrogation of the relationship between literature and truth. This relationship 
rests on the peculiar acts of literature in its encounter with the question “what 
is?”  What should be underlined is that Derrida’s undertaking of a comparison 
between Mallarmé and Plato does not aim to produce opposing exemplarities to 
proceed from. Derrida seeks the logic of operation of mimesis in Plato’s and 
Mallerme’s text and the relationship between them. Thus, this engagement is the 
very interrogation of the exemplarity to reveal its conditions of possibility and 
impossibility.  The history of the relationship between literature and truth, for 
Derrida, relies on a particular understanding of Mimesis and this history is what 
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he studies, not through what this history summons forth, but rather what 
summons forth this particular history. For that matter, the proper names of 
Malarmé and Plato “are not real references but indications for the sake of 
convenience and initial analysis” between which “a whole history has taken 
place” (Derrida, 2004, p.200). 
Accordingly, Platonism means for Derrida certain anti-Platonisms as well, which 
has sustained and fed Platonism throughout the history of western thought. A 
critique of Platonism would require the interrogation of the distinguishability of 
the imitator and the imitated and to suggest how the relationship which governs 
and maintains the superiority of the latter to the former might be displaced. As a 
supplement to memory or as the relationship between two entities, Derrida 
suggests, all these kinds of studying mimesis are controlled and contaminated by 
the priority and anteriority of a truth.  This accounts for the importance of the 
“Mimique”: “The Mime imitates nothing” (p.208). The significance of Mallarmé 
arises not only from the fact that there is nothing that the imitation refers to but 
also from the fact that there is still a mimicry maintained which does not break 
all its ties with Platonic mimesis. 
Mallarmé even maintains (and maintains himself in) the structure 
of the phantasma as it is defined by Plato: the simulacrum as the 
copy of a copy. With the exception that there is no longer any 
model, and hence, no copy, and that this structure (which 
encompasses the Plato’s text, including his attempts to escape it) is 
no longered referred to any ontology or even any dialectic. ... [ 
Mallarméan displacement] is a simulacrum of Platonism or 
Hegelianism, which is separated from what it simulates only by a 
barely perceptible veil, about which one can just as well say that it 
already runs-unnoticed- between Platonism and itself, between 
Hegelianism and itself. Between Mallarmé’s text and itself. It is 
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thus not simply false to say that Mallarmé is a Platonist or a 
Hegelian. But it is above all not true. (p. 218) 
 
The play of mimesis introduced by Mallarmé is a hymen, a simulacrum of 
‘Hegelian curtains’ and Platonic walls. By removing the referent and yet 
sustaining the reference is also the removal of the concealed reality behind the 
false appearances. The inbetween structure of the hymen stands between desire 
and fulfillment but cannot be consummated by either. It is not a synthesis or 
partition but rather something in between them. “The hymen interposes itself 
between mimicry and mimēsis or rather mimēsis and mimēsis” (p.229) This 
hymenology, the Mallarméan suspension of opposites explains why Derrida 
considers this text of Mallarmé as a handbook of literature. This handbook 
would announce that literature has no essence and “the ‘what is’ in the question 
of ‘what is literature’ is worth what the hymen is worth” (p. 232). 
I will discuss this question “what is literature” along with the possibilities and 
futurities it implies along with Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s short story “Before 
the Wall”. By now, we have discussed the Platonic understanding of writing and 
how Mallarméan text points to a mimesis which is not governed under the 
sovereignty of truth. Derrida’s notice with regard to Platonic philosophy has 
been its attempt to determine and control the undecidabilities. If literature’s 
relationship with truth has only always asserted to be mimetic and secondary, 
what implication does the play of undecidability have for the question of 
literature?  
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3. LITERATURE FOR DELEUZE AND DERRIDA 
 
In the previous chapter we have discussed Deleuzian and Derridean intervention 
to Plato’s thought. The significance of this intervention for Deleuze was a 
problem of making difference by depriving the Idea from its transcendental rule 
of resemblance. Derridean intervention is also an insertion of undecidability 
back in Platonic thought with an operation of re-marking.  What we will study in 
this chapter will be an extention of the previous chapter in the sense that we will 
focus on Deleuze’s and Derrida’s criticisms of Platonic ‘is’ with the notion of 
becoming and the question of “what is literature” respectively. 
Deleuze and Guattari see a revolutionary force in literature not as a literature of 
revolution but rather as a revolutionariness which is granted only during the 
course of writing. Writing is a passage of life and a corridor of becoming by 
which one might take lines of flight from majoritarian formations including that 
of language. As “becoming” is always becoming-multiple, as to the 
revolutionariness of literature, Deleuze and Guattari argue for its invoking a 
people-to-come. Here, we will try to follow the clues of the kind of relationality 
and sociality is endorsed by the coming of the new people in the pacts of Kafka, 
Masoch and Bartleby. In the second part, we will proceed with Derridean 
questioning of literature which takes place on the borders of its subject, pointing 
to how literature is distinguished from the philosophical and the legal as both of 
these discourses try to maintain themselves by the exclusion of narrativity.  
Following Derrida’s article on Kafka’s short story “Vor dem Gesetz (Before the 
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Law)”, we will argue for the ways by which literature as a fictive narrativity 
might provide the hyperbolique conditions of democracy by a simulacral 
repetition of the law.  Under the protection of the laws which conditions its 
emergence, Derrida introduces a subversive juridicity literature may attain by 
playing with the law.  Within this subversion and irresponsibility, we will find an 
astute criticism of current democracies in which every citizen should always 
obey the law of response as a responsible citizen. For Derrida, it is the 
incalculable life of Bartleby and his undecidable proposition that makes him 
point to a democracy-to-come without simply being a no-saying rebel.  After 
having discussed these two views on literature, we will pass to the next chapter 
where we will try to understand how the becoming-pack in Deleuze and the 
fragile relationship with the law of society in Derrida explicate new forms of 
sociality.  
As in the complementarity we have observed in their criticism of Plato, we might 
recognize the complementarity of Deleuze and Derrida’s thoughts in the context 
of literature as well.  Here, their reading of Kafka and Bartleby is of crucial 
importance. What is at stake in their studies of Kafka evolves around the concept 
of law.  Deleuze and Guattari try to liberate Kafka from the psychoanalytic 
interpretations which reduce Kafka’s text to an obedience to the rule of the 
Father.  If the law is everywhere in Kafka’s texts, this is explainable only by the 
immanence of the law, the law of desire: “where one believed there was the law, 
there is in fact desire and desire alone” (Deleuze&Guattari, p.49). According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt and 
subjectivity of enunciation are only the worst ways of reading Kafka, as they do 
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not consider how these themes operate on the surface to convey the law of 
desire.   Derrida’s interpretation of Kafka’s story, as well, follows this theme of 
law in that Derrida explains the inaccessibility of the law by the law of différance 
which defers any appropriation.  In a complementary way, both the law of desire 
and the law of différance are criticisms of transcendentality of the law in the 
Kantian reformulation of the Good and the Law.  
Bartleby, as a story of common interest, may even consolidate this 
complementarity. For Derrida, Bartleby’s undecidable proposition is a critical 
non-response, which does not acquire its right and responsibilities from the 
economy of current democracies. Without a decidable affirmation or negation, 
Bartleby  points to a democracy-to-come by presenting a rupture in the dialectics 
of  responsibility and irresponsibility.  Deleuze’s interest in Bartleby also is 
because of his “queer formula” of saying no without saying no.  In Bartleby’s frail 
relationship with American society, Deleuze finds the reasons why both Soviet 
and American revolutions in XIX. century both turned out to be unsuccessful.  
Within this failure, we find the implications of the sociality, of the people-to-
come in which Bartleby can comfortably take his walks.4 One might instantly 
notice the emphasis on futurity in both notions of people-to-come and 
democracy-to-come that will lead us to the next chapter, while in this chapter we 
will be dealing with how Deleuze and Derrida’s thoughts on literature is a 
political study in that it concerns the relationship between the individual and the 
society, the particular and the general.  
3. 1. Deleuze and Literature 
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The question of literature in Deleuze’s thought, his employment of and 
references to works and names of literary writers is not a question by and of 
itself, but rather it is one of many interrelated questions which resonate with one 
another. First, we shall provide a burrow of these connections, disconnections 
and quasi-connections that take place across Deleuze’s various texts.   
First of all, similar to Deleuze’s engagement with other styles of art, namely 
cinema and painting, his engagement with literature does not seek to apply some 
theories onto literary texts, or search for transcendent conditions to be derived 
from them, but rather it undergoes an immanent investigation of them, trying to 
seek how they function and what kind of life they imply.  
Although one may encounter many writers, verses, stories that are spread out 
everywhere in Deleuze’s work, Essays Critical and Clinical is one of his late 
books where such references become most intense. In this book, Deleuze (1998) 
strolls among various writers such as Lewis Carroll, Louis Wolfson, Samuel 
Beckett, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, Walter Whitman, Herman Melville, Émile 
Zola, T. E. Lawrence, Arthur Rimbaud, Antonin Artaud and Franz Kafka, to 
name a few, through short passages. In The Logic of Sense (1990), Lewis Caroll, 
Klossowski, Michel Tournier and Zola among others. In Masochism, Deleuze 
(1989) focuses on texts of Sacher-Masoch and Marquis de Sade, making remarks 
on the fragile relationship between psychoanalysis and literature, and in Proust 
and Signs where Deleuze (2000) investigates the signs operating in the texts of 
Proust as self-differentiating essences. Another important work questioning 
literature is Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature which Deleuze (1986) wrote with 
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Félix Guattari. In this book, reading the letters, stories and novels of Franz 
Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari outline the ways in which literary-machines 
function and they describe what a minor literature is. In all these works, as 
Smith (in Deleuze, 1998)  suggests, it is as if Deleuze is trying to investigate the 
immanent ‘logic’ of literature as he investigates that of painting and of cinema in 
his books on Francis Bacon and on cinema, respectively. It is an attempt to 
comprehend how literary machines do function, what modes of existence they 
imply, under what conditions a literature is revolutionary and how it may free 
our life, our desire.  Literature, in that sense, has an essential link to life, a life 
freed from all determinations that imprison it. 
It is in the first chapter of Essays Critical and Clinical, entitled ‘Literature and 
Life’ that Gilles Deleuze (1998), explains the crucial conjunction between 
literature and life. Writing, for Deleuze, is always a matter of becoming; always 
proceeding from the middle: it is never complete. It is via this becoming that one 
becomes woman, animal, molecular or imperceptible. In writing, these 
becomings may pass to one another or take place at various levels at the same 
time. In this way, writing provides a line of escape from dominant formations of 
thoughts and expressions so that it is impossible not to write. Deleuze asks 
rhetorically: “The shame of being a man- is there any better reason to write?” 
(1998, p. 1). This is not a single-layered shame that one can disavow simply by 
recounting one’s memories and what one has lived.  For Deleuze, literature is 
more than mere narration of the places one has seen, the things one has 
experienced. Literature always operates in excess of the lived and the livable.  
 47
“All writers, all creators, are shadows. ... You don’t get very far in 
literature with the system ‘I’ve seen a lot and been to lots of places,’ 
where the authors first do things and tell us about them. 
Narcissism in authors is awful, because shadows can not be 
narcissistic” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 134). 
 
Literature as an enterprise is more related to enacting new affects and percepts 
than new affections and perceptions. It is a play on the domain of virtuals that 
precedes and overflows any subjective formation.  The Desert in “Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom”, The Ocean in “Moby-Dick”, and The Burrow in one of Kafka’s stories 
are all percepts that go beyond the perceptions of the perceiving subject.  Affects 
and  percepts, unlike affections and perceptions, do not assume a subjective 
individuation, but constitute haecceities, nonsubjecified assemblages that 
consist of sets of speeds and slownesses. It is in this way that Lawrence becomes 
indistinguishable from the Desert. Literature, by extracting affects and percepts 
out of lived experiences, operates without subjective formations, by invention of 
new virtual conjunctions. 
Clearly, this way of writing is different than the way Artaud also mentioned 
critically of an oeuvre, a book, a text which comes with a promise of totality and 
guidance. According to Guattari (1996), to write before and after already written 
books is not the same as writing a book. Writing brings about the possibility of a 
living text when it is written on a palimpsest, a surface on which one writes over 
and under already written premises. Writing is not a matter of erasing what has 
been written but rather an act of underwriting or overwriting the spaces left in 
order to make the text contradict itself, or to push it until it obliterates itself.  For 
Guattari, this way of writing constitutes a chain: a chain of love. Due to this love 
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writing enables, we are left with little possibility to talk about a writer or an 
author, because being a writer always means to become something other than a 
writer. 
The run away induced by writing is an athletic event if not an olympic one, an 
escape from the formations of the organic body. It is an affective athleticism by 
which one enters a zone of indiscernability before any subjective formation. In 
that sense, Melville’s Ahab is an athlete escaping to become-whale in the Ocean, 
where Ocean is not simply a perception but a percept. According to Deleuze 
(1998), writer as an athlete is similar to the swimming champion of Kafka who 
does not know how to swim or an “athlete in bed’” who might only take 
stationary flights. This athlete in bed who escapes from the organic body has a 
very peculiar and delicate health. In fact, for Deleuze, literature is an enterprise 
of health. This does not necessarily mean that the writers ought to be in good 
health. To the contrary, being a runaway from the organic formations, writing 
enables the writer to acquire an anorganic, schizoid life. Neither does this mean 
that the writer ought to be in bad health. The process of schizophrenization here 
does not refer to a psychotic or neurotic writer. In fact, these states refer to 
stations, according to Deleuze, where the becomings, the flows or the overflows 
are rather blocked and interrupted. As to this fragile health, for Deleuze, 
... a drained life or a personal life isn’t enough for an artist. You 
don’t write with your ego, your memory and your illnesses. In 
the act of writing there’s an attempt to make life something 
more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it. The 
artist or philosopher has a slender, frail health, a weak 
constitution, a shaky hold on things: look at Spinoza, Nietzsche, 
Lawrence. Yet it is not death that breaks them, but seeing, 
experiencing, thinking too much life” (1995, p.143). 
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Writer is not simply a patient who suffers from bad health, but rather he is a 
physician, a “physician of himself and the world”. Similar to a philosopher who 
creates concepts or an artist who creates new sensations, writer as a physician is 
a symptomatologist who points to new possibilities of living. Thus the anorganic 
life necessitates both a good health to ease and facilitate the passages and 
becomings and a bad health without which such becomings would again be 
impossible. 
The literature we are talking about is of course a ‘minor literature’, or a 
particular mode of ‘writing’, since revolutionariness is only to be granted on the 
course of writing rather than a privileged situation ascribed to writers or to 
literature. With this conception of literature, we are no longer interested in the 
meanings of books, novels or stories, but their functions, whether they function 
or not. In their book on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) explain the 
conditions or functions to be found in minor literatures. Firstly, a minor 
literature must instigate a deterritorialization within a major literature by a 
delicate treatment of language. Secondly, in minor literature, nothing is 
personal; everything connects to a political immediacy. Individual concerns 
instantly interpenetrate with bureaucratic, juridical or economic concerns. 
Thirdly, in minor literature, everything bears a collective value. Any statement 
does not return to the writer as the subject of individual enunciation, but rather 
expresses collective assemblages of enunciation.   
What does the first condition imply? According to Deleuze and Guattari, if 
writing is a passage of Life through which one experiences a becoming-other, 
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this becoming-other is always accompanied by the becoming-minor of an 
established language. For Deleuze (1986), the major and the minor does not 
refer to two different languages, this distinction is a matter of usage, functioning.  
Deleuze points to such effects of literature on language by referring to Proust: 
“Great books are written in a kind of foreign language.” This peculiar use of 
language does not aim to create another language, but enacts the becoming-
foreign or becoming-minor of language itself. By this minor usage, the 
formations, structures and grammatical determinations of the major language 
are challenged such that new ways of expression are invented within it. Thus 
minor literature is not defined by literature of this or that language, it is not a 
matter of making distinctions, but rather it is a movement to be engaged in every 
established literature. Rather than a reteritorialization in a marginalized 
language or patois, it is a leap, a hole in the constant grammatical relations 
imposed by the major literature; it is what makes the language stutter.  
This mode of writing in which writers are no longer considered clinical cases, 
also frees text from its sublimational determinations. The act of writing becomes 
related more to the nonpersonal rather than to personality, since in writing 
writers attain the possibility of becoming something other than him or herself. 
When a becoming-other takes place, it is not possible to talk of a personological 
or psychiatric approach to literary texts. Literature is not regarded as a field 
where one can always return back to the personal life of an author. As writing 
itself is a passage of life, no fixed psychoanalytic framework such as the oedipal 
triangle would exhaust the text totally. As a line of escape, writing obviously 
escapes from the oedipal structures which imprisons life and obstructs the 
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functioning of the text. Writing is not a search for the father, but rather a road, a 
stroll, a voyage away from him by which one becomes road as in Kerouac. In a 
similar fashion, Kafka’s employment of the familial triangle is an adventure 
within which it merges with various other triangles such as historical, political, 
economic ones so that the personal always operates on a political basis. In Kafka, 
the oedipal structure is exaggerated in such a way that with all these new 
connections, the oedipal structure is deterritorialized, and the problem evolves 
from being a question of liberty to a question of escape. 
Yet, insofar as the comic expansion of Oedipus allows one to see 
these other oppressor triangles [economic, political, juridical 
etc.] through the lens of the microscope, there appears at the 
same time the possibility of an escape, a line of escape. To the 
inhumanness of the ‘diabolical powers,’ there is the answer of a 
becoming-animal: to become a beetle, to become a dog, to 
become an ape, “head over heels and away,” rather than 
lowering one’s head and remaining a bureaucrat, inspector, 
judge, or judged (1986, p. 12). 
 
As the quotation above suggests, in Kafka, the escape is not only from the father, 
but also from the director, from the business, from the bureaucrats, from the 
judges and all interpenetrating structures which come to imprison a life. In this 
regard, the individual concern always gets permeated with a political immediacy 
and a revolutionariness, which is in fact the only way of being revolutionary.  
As it is has been emphasized, these revolutionary flights are not personal or 
individual, although literary texts are written by singular agents or refer to 
singular agents. For Deleuze (1986), becoming-minoritarian always implies a 
kind of collectivity, a sociality. In becoming animal, for instance, there is always 
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a becoming-pack. Thus literature invokes ‘a people’ by its very enunciation.  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
[t]he literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary 
machine-to-come, not at all for ideological reasons but because 
the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of 
a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in this milieu 
(1986, pp. 17-18). 
 
Literature, hence, is the very invention of a people, people who are missing for 
the time being. This fabulative function of literature defines its political task. 
Rather than addressing an already existing people, literature aims to invoke a 
people, a relationality which does not yet exist, and by so doing, becomes a 
micropolitical intervention of a minority. However, the struggle of a minority 
should never take the majoritarian formations as its model, but instead should 
remain in the flux of becoming-minor that incessantly escapes dominant 
formations. That is why Deleuze (1995) prefers ‘fabulation’ over ‘utopia’ for 
artistic expression. Being given a political stake, fabulation differs from the 
myth-making of religious and the legend-creating of national literatures. As 
Lambert (2002) asserts, since the self perception of the minorities is also 
attempted to be determined by the majority, as the truth is already controlled by 
the dominant formations, the fabulation of literary texts should turn towards the 
power of falsehood to realize the principle of fabulation which  governs the very 
production of the truth as well.  
To understand why literature, whose three conditions we have been describing is 
a minor one, we might refer to the concept of minority, a complex notion “with 
musical, literary, linguistic, as well as juridical and political references” (Deleuze 
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& Guattari, 2004, p.116). It should be emphasized that the distinction between 
minority and majority is not a matter of quantity but a matter of relations 
internal to the quantity. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, 
[i]t is obvious that “man” holds the majority, even if he is less 
numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, 
homosexuals, etc. That is because he appears twice, once in the 
constant and again in the variable from which the constant is 
extracted. … A determination different from that of the constant 
will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature and 
regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or outsystem. 
… There is a majoritarian “fact,”, but it is the analytical fact of 
Nobody, as opposed to the becoming-minoritarian of everybody 
(2004, p. 116) 
 
Minor literature concerns everybody by the following question: “how to become 
a nomad and immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s own language” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p.19). As an operation within the major language, 
minor literature is a theft of a baby from its crib. This stolen baby becomes the 
very possibility of the new sociality, new society, the new pack to come. 
However, the active solidarity to be brought about by this literature does not 
grant the writer an organic involvement in the community he lives in. It is 
rather a frail relationship in which the writer does not simply address his 
community but writes for and points to a non-existent community, a 
community yet to come.  
We have discussed the three properties which characterize a minor literature. A 
becoming-other of language comes together with a deterritorialization of 
subjectivities promising a new sociality to come. But one is compelled to ask: in 
what ways is this society-to-come invoked by minor literatures?  We might 
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answer this question by reconsidering the concepts with which the concept of 
minor literature is in affinity.  We have already stated that writing or literature 
as passage of life is inseparable from a process of becoming, rhizomatic 
connection of multiplicities creating a line of escape from the dominant 
formations of language and subjectivity.  To understand this new sociality 
better, we might look at what the notion of becoming suggests for Deleuze, as it 
is in writing that one can enter into becoming-animal, becoming-plant, 
becoming-woman, becoming-black or becoming-imperceptible.  
We have already stated that becoming is never contained within one term, but 
rather is an aparallel evolution of two series which do not operate according to a 
model of resemblance or correspondence. It is a trespassing of borders thanks 
to an alliance, an alliance with a devil, a demon, an Anomalous which serves as 
the borderline of this reciprocal involution. In a certain way, this new sociality is 
instigated with a pact.  The letters Kafka writes are not only a medium to 
correspond with the recipient, but rather it has another addressee, “the woman 
that the father is supposed to have made him lose” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, 
p.29). With the diabolical use of the duality of the sender and receiver, Kafka 
makes an alliance with the devil, as the letters always sustain a distance against 
the proximity of a conjugal contract. By letters, a conjugal contract is disavowed 
for a demonic pact, which presages becomings-animal in the stories and 
becomings-molecular in the novels, three components of expression 
continuously traversing one another.  
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In Melville’s Moby-Dick, Captain Ahab’s becoming-whale is also an alliance; 
Moby-Dick serving as a barrier Ahab wants to pass through.  It stands at the 
borderline of the whale community beyond which any other multiplicity may 
not pass without a change in its dimensions or magnitudes, meaning a change 
in its nature. This relationship with the Anomalous is not a domestic or 
sentimental relationship but a demonic pact by which both parties undergo a 
becoming. Nevertheless, this demonic pact coexists with the breach of another 
contract: Ahab betrays the law of whalers according to which when one 
encounters a whale, one must hunt it. 
In another story of Melville, “Bartleby” as well, we may recognize this double 
contract. Bartleby’s queer formula “I would prefer not to” which creates an 
undecidable statement within the syntax of a familiar language opens him a 
leeway for living without gaining any particularity. This statement is not at all a 
rejection or a rejection without a determinable content: it is a rejection of 
nothing and everything at the same time. If Bartleby had simply rejected the 
orders the attorney gave to him, he would simply turn into a rebel and thus 
could not have sustained this delicate exteriority as “a pure outsider [exclu] to 
whom no social position can be attributed” (1998, p.73). When we consider the 
bizarre behaviors of the attorney, we might configure the terms of this contract 
as follows: 
… the attorney, following his promotion, had decided to make this 
person, without objective references, a man of confidence (un 
home de confidence) who would owe everything to him. He wants 
to make him his man. [Bartleby, in return] will sit near his master 
and copy, listening to him, but without being seen, like a night bird 
who cannot stand to be looked at. 
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After the attorney changes Bartleby’s place in the office by moving him next to 
other officers, he breaches this contract and after this event Bartleby stops 
correcting and copying texts. Bartleby, from the debris of this broken 
arrangement invents his smooth expression of hesitation.  Out of this breach of 
contract, he retains a singularity with respect to the attorney, the figure of the 
Father and the Law.  
The main problem of Melville’s oeuvre, for Deleuze, is the reconciliation of the 
singular with the general. As such, what Melville affirms is a “society of 
celibates” instead of a “society of brothers”.  This society does not form a nation, 
a family, a heritage or a Father. For Deleuze, this form of sociality is already 
envisioned by the Americans before their independence and by Russians before 
the Bolshevik revolution in XIX. century. The former calling for a ‘universal 
emigration’ and the latter a ‘universal proletarization’: American pragmatism 
and Russian socialism.  What marks the failure of American pragmatist and 
Russian socialist revolutions is actually the rebirth of a nation, the coming back 
of the Father, which annuls the singularities of sons without fathers with the 
return of paternal authority.  
What we see in both Sade’s and Masoch’s writing is also a confrontation with 
this law of society in their respective styles. Deleuze underlines the difference of 
their ‘pornological’ styles to point to the impossibility of a sado-masochist 
compound or a relationship of complementarity between them. The masochist 
educator is distinguished from the Sadist instructor in that the former 
persistently enters into new contracts whereas the latter is in constant 
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nullification of all laws. The basis of distinction between the Sadist and the 
Masochist can be summarized by the distinction between a process of negation 
and a process of disavowal.  The Sadist wants to make his ideal real by a process 
of negating, whereas the masochist ascends to the suprasensual by suspending 
the real.  According to Deleuze, in Sade and Masoch we can identify a criticism 
of Kantian conception of law which came as a reversal of the ancient Platonic 
conception. For Kant, the Good follows the Law, rather than the other way 
around. Law does not require a higher authority to justify its sovereignty, but it 
is the justification of its own without need of higher reference. Sade presents the 
ironic criticism of this conception of law by substituting the law with an anti-law 
of pure negation. Masoch’s humorous criticism, on the other hand, works by an 
apparent obedience to the law. In masochist rites, even though the laws are 
applied strictly, we encounter a result which is totally unexpected. His 
contracts, which are made only to be breached, parody law in the sense that 
what is forbidden turns into the very outcome of the punishment.  
… contract implies in principle certain conditions like the free 
acceptance of the parties, a limited duration and the preservation 
of inalienable rights, the law that it generates always tends to 
forget its own origins and annul these restrictive conditions. Thus 
contract-law relationship involves in a sense a mystification. To 
imagine that a contract or quasi contract is at the origin of society 
is to invoke conditions which are necessarily invalidated as soon as 
the law comes into being. For the law, once established, violates 
the contract in that it can apply to a third party, is valid for an 
indeterminate period and recognizes no inalienable rights. This 
process of invalidation of contract is reflected, as we have seen, in 
the peculiar progression of Masoch’s successive love contracts, the 
terms of which become increasingly strict, as if to prepare the way 
for the law that will eventually override them. Since the law results 
in our enslavement, we should place enslavement first, as the 
dreadful object of the contract. One could even say, as a general 
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rule, that in masochism the contract is caricatured in order to 
emphasize its ambiguous destination (Deleuze, 1989, pp. 91-92). 
 
As Deleuze suggests, Masoch’s contracts with his lovers, which are prepared 
with utmost care but are ultimately overthrown, is a humorous criticism by 
placing the origin of law in the contract. This contract is breachable by nature, 
in other words it breaches itself to gain its sovereign power.  
Parallel to Kafkaesque contract with the devil, Ahab’s contract with Moby Dick, 
and Bartleby’s contract which displaces both preference and nonpreference, 
Masoch’s contract with his lovers, as well, always come with the breach of 
another contract, a law which tries to capture the processes of becoming of 
these characters.  Kantian law as that which perpetuates its sovereignty by guilt, 
which is a pure form stated only through its punishment is the very object of 
dismantling in Kafka. For Deleuze and Guattari, if themes of transcendent law, 
interior guilt and subject of enunciation persist in Kafka’s texts, it is because 
Kafka instigates a superficial movement through which all these are displaced.  
They are only gears of primary affective tonalities of fear, escape and 
dismantling which are vibrated through letters, stories and novels respectively.  
What Kafka shows is “where one believed there was law, there is in act desire 
and desire alone. Justice is desire and not law” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, 
p.49).  The unrepresentability of justice comes from the unrepresentability of 
desire.  Justice as such is the very renouncement of the idea of transcendence, 
everything and everybody is part of it, since it is the immanent process of desire.   
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Accordingly, if the fabulative function of literature consists in making pacts of 
becoming by breaching the contract of laws, these pacts should be understood 
by this immanent process of desire as an interminable flux. The alliance in a 
pact does not try to govern, root or fixate the individual parties, and whenever it 
does so, the flux recuperates the law of the father, meaning that lines of 
segmentarity have started to dominate the lines of flight again.  The pacts of 
becoming involve peoplings, but it envisions a community which is not 
governed solely by a central movement. At this juncture, we might listen to 
Franny recounting her dream: 
There is a desert.  Again it wouldn’t make sense to say that I am in 
the desert. It’s a panoramic vision of the desert, and it is not a 
tragic or uninhabited desert. It’s only a desert because of its ocher 
color and its blazing, shadowless sun. There is a teeming crowd in 
it, a swarm of bees, a rumble of soccer players, or a group of 
Tuareg. I am on the edge of the crowd, at the periphery; but I 
belong to it, I am attached to it by one of my extremities, a hand 
or foot. I know that periphery is the only place I can be, that I 
would die if I let myself be drawn into the center of the crowd, but 
just as certainly if I let go of the crowd. This is not an easy position 
to stay in, it is even very difficult to hold, for these beings are in 
constant motion and their movements are unpredictable and 
follow no rhythm (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p.32). 
 
A very delicate position for living. Bartleby also tries to keep the connection to 
his swarm without being absorbed in it, “I would prefer not to” is his fragile 
position in which Bartleby is able to maintain his life.  The fabulative function of 
literature, its inventing of a people lies under this creation of a Life.  The 
society-to-come is thus the society of celibates, of bachelors. It is a society 
without fathers, an archipelago, a “wall of loose, uncemented stones, where 
every element has value in itself but also in relation to others: isolated and 
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floating relations, islands and straits, immobile points and sinuous lines ...” 
(Deleuze, 1998, p.86). 
3. 2. Derrida and Literature 
To give an account of why Derrida has been interested in literature always 
assumes certain conventional categories Derrida has been problematizing. 
Clearly, what makes such an occupation as something to be accounted for is the 
presumption that Derrida as a philosopher, as the “lover of truth” ought to have 
good reasons and aims to be interested in literature. Within such a speculation, 
the category of truth does not only constitute the main axis of philosophical 
thought but also governs literature’s relationship to truth by marking it as 
something distinct and even inferior to philosophy. If Derrida’s philosophy does 
not loyally follow this philosophical axis - without rejecting the category of truth-
, we should take this opportunity to say that his occupation with literature can 
not be subsumed under another higher agenda, be it philosophical or of any 
other sort. If there is a difference between the way Derrida engages with so-
called literary texts and philosophical texts, this difference does not rely on the 
conventional distinction between philosophy and literature but probably owes to 
the singularity of each deconstructive reading in each instance. Thus if Derrida 
asks the question “what is literature?”, it is only a quotation to consider the 
grammatological topology that enables one to pose such a question.  In this 
question, the relationship between “what is” and “literature” is confronted as an 
issue of origin, of demarcation, of ambitions and goals and at the same time of 
what literature is not. 
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For Derrida, each reading of a text bears a singularity which is impossible to 
reduce to other instances of reading. Yet, the singularity of the text is not posited 
as an obstacle to iterability, since if it were so, it would be hardly possible to read 
a text. Thus the peculiarity of this singularity arises out of its particular 
relationship with iterability, repetition and generality. This iterability constitutes 
the very possibility of labeling a text as belonging to a certain genre. The text 
stands before a law, being marked with it. But this law of genre does not operate 
as a law of belonging, of interiority which closes the text on itself. Rather, 
Derrida speaks of a re-mark, a double mark which might escape the governance 
of truth by its displacement. 
This re-mark suggests that there is no essence of literature that resist change 
across various literary texts, there is no border to literariness explainable by 
what it borders. But still, even if we renounce the essential attributes to literary 
texts, we are still bound to explain its status in the cultural and political arena 
within which the literary is described as such. According to Derrida, literature is 
an institution, a strange and recent one which emerges as a result of certain 
cultural, political, historical processes. Thus, as an institution which renounces 
any constitutive definition, the promise of literature lies in a singular 
relationship with the socio-politico-cultural context it is situated in. It does not 
enjoy any ahistorical privilege of possessing an immutable essence, but rather, 
standing before the law, it might question the very historicality it is itself bound 
with. The position of this institution before the rules is sustained by its ability to 
say everything. According to Derrida, 
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… the space of literature is not only that of an instituted fiction but 
also a fictive institution which in principle allows one to say 
everything. To say everything is no doubt to gather, by translating, 
all figures into one another, to totalize by formalizing, but to say 
everything is also to break out of [franchir] prohibitions. To 
affranchise oneself [s’affranchir] - in every field where law can lay 
down the law (1992, p.36). 
 
This authorization is also connected to the emanation of the idea of democracy. 
Although this authority to say everything is something granted by the present 
idea of democracy, only its interruption may call for a democracy-to-come. The 
right to response in all ways includes a non-response as well, an irresponsibility 
in responding to someone on account of what one has written. For Derrida, this 
irresponsibility is in the name of a future, not as a time in which democracy will 
be there in its presence, but rather as an endless promise for a futurity not 
governed by metaphysical concepts of time and presence. To come, for Derrida, 
does not denote a utopia on which present previsions, foresights and 
descriptions are projected.  It follows the structure of the trace which “does not 
let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present” (1976, p.66). This future 
democracy or democracy to come consists in a responsibility to the other, to 
provide an opening in which the other may find a place without our 
designations, controls and expectations.  The democracy to come is a promise of 
a relationality or sociality in which the other is freed from any reduction to the 
same. Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche, Rousseau and Gide during his 
adolescence, and the political conditions in the fifties makes Derrida think of 
literature at that time to mean something particular among other things: “I 
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thought of literature as the end of family, and of the society it represented, even 
if family was also, on the other hand, persecuted” (1992, p. 39).  
The significance of non-response becomes evident in Derrida’s comments on 
Bartleby, in his bizarre response: “I would prefer not to”. Derrida, in The Gift of 
Death (1992a), argues that this statement opens an undecidable promise as a 
responsible response which actually does not respond. It is an incomplete 
sentence that escapes saying something determinable, positive or negative. In 
this non-response, according to Derrida, we find 
… the hyperbolique condition of democracy which seems to 
contradict a certain determined and historically limited concept of 
democracy, a concept which links it to the concept of a subject that 
is calculated, accountable, imputable and responsible, one that 
“must respond” and “ must tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth” (1992a, p. 23). 
 
As we see, Derrida distinguishes between the subjects of present 
democracies who are obliged to respond loyally to the truths and laws 
that govern society and the subjects of literary discourse who might, in 
this hyperbolique condition of non-responsibility, enjoy an opportunity 
which the social subjects do not. This space opened up by literature, 
constitutes a futurity without any recourse to the truth-governed 
democracies of the time.  
For Derrida, this is made possible by a simulacral repetition of the law. This 
doubling or the repetition of the law constitutes one of the main concerns of 
Derrida’s article on Kafka’s short story “Before the Law”. This article which 
shares the same title with the story, is a crucial instance insofar as it prefigures 
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the topology in which we will consider literature and law with reference to one 
another. The sameness of the titles is an important move, since, for Derrida, the 
entitling is an issue of topology insofar as any other same combination of words 
which appear in any other part of the text would not be referring to the same 
thing with the title which appears before the text. The title of Derrida’s essay, the 
title of Kafka’s story and the very first words of this story are all “before the law”. 
Thus Derrida’s title points to a play of difference before his essay begins.   
Kafka’s story is about a man from the country who comes in front of the guarded 
door of the law and insistently attempts to get access to the Law. The man is 
surprised to be denied entrance, since, according to him, as Law is universal, it 
ought to be accessible to everybody, all the time. But contrary to his 
suppositions, he is vetoed from the very first doorkeeper and what is more, there 
are many other doors and doorkeepers along the way. According to the 
confession of the first guardian, it gets more and more difficult on the way: “The 
third doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I can not bear to look at him”. 
Derrida’s interest in this short story is more than a literary criticism if literary 
criticism is to presume a literariness for any criticism. For Derrida, this short 
story which is also a part of the Trial, but has been printed as a separate work 
constitutes a chance to question the literariness of any text. After all, according 
to what do we make a decision in order to distinguish between the literary and 
the non literary? What is the law that governs this separation? Kafka’s “Before 
the Law” is crucial in its literary act, as a ‘literary’ work it also stages the very 
operation of the Law.  
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Derrida begins his essay with three assumptions we might instantly hold about 
the story Before the Law, which he cites at the very beginning of his article. The 
first assumption is that this text has an identity, a unity, a beginning and an end 
which is justified with reference to the German original, an original which 
governs the self-identity of the story. The second assumption is about the author 
of the text. We presume that the author is strictly a real character who is 
different than the fictive characters in the text which he authors. Thirdly, this 
text is a literary one, and not simply because it is narrative, fictive or allegoric, 
since “there are fictions, allegories, myths, symbols, or parables that are not 
specifically literary” (1992, pp.186-187). 
Although these are the initial remarks of Derrida, he will not be content to 
respond to these questions just to undermine the generality of a law and its 
repercussions, but will point to “the singularity of a proceeding which, in the 
course of a unique drama, summons them [these laws] before an irreplaceable 
corpus, before this very text, before Before the Law.”(1992, p.187) Derrida’s 
emphasis is on the ‘encounter between law and singularity’ and the enigma of 
this encounter. Within this encounter, Derrida discusses Kafka’s story in relation 
to the Kantian moral law which “never shows itself but is the only cause of that 
respect” (1992, p. 190). For Derrida, the “what if” structure inhabiting Kantian 
moral law is the introduction of a history and narration into the law which is 
carefully guarded from such an intrusion. It is these motifs of guard and 
narrativity in Kantian law that attracts Derrida’s interest in Kafka’s short story. 
Explained as such, Derrida’s question is a challenge to Kantian 
 66
transcendentality: “what if the law, without being itself transfixed by literature, 
shared the conditions of possibility with the literary object” (1992, p.191)? 
The notion of law, as a universal, homogenous and unitary structure is 
incompatible with the notion of story. This exclusion of narration and history 
from law is what Derrida calls “the law of laws”. Similar to the man denied the 
access to the law, historicity is also prohibited such an access. This 
inaccessibility does not depend on the type of law, be it moral, political or 
natural. Derrida’s interest is in the concealing of all these laws or of the law of 
the laws what makes them law as such.  
What this distinction between law and law of laws suggest is that any singular 
instance does not only stand before the law, but also before the law of the laws, 
before which law itself stands as well.  Any attempt of accounting for the origin 
or sovereignty of law encounters a double impasse: whenever this originarity is 
attempted to be accounted for, its authority gets impaired as the authority of the 
law defies necessary explanation, but on the other hand, whenever one abstains 
from giving such an historical account, then the authority of law remains 
unthought promoting a blind obedience.  The significance of Kant’s moral 
imperative lies in its attempt of surpassing this double bind. Kant, by putting the 
law before freedom, alters the scheme by his contention that the more one 
participates in the law, the freer one is. Sustaining the ahistoricality of the law, 
Kant aims to maintain the ground of necessary obedience to that law. Derrida’s 
critical point of intervention to the Kantian model of law is the very point where 
every singular act is checked on the basis of an “as if” structure in order to be a 
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lawful act. For Derrida, this structure of “as if” is the very placement of 
narrativity at the heart of law. 
It is indeed this concealing that makes the quest for the origin of law irresistible 
for Derrida. Nevertheless, it is not only irresistible but also impossible. Since 
such a quest would both mean both to take the law as the non-historical, and at 
the same time to continue revealing the ‘history of the non-history’. At this 
juncture, Freud’s quest for discovering the origin of moral law is exemplary.  For 
Freud, at the origin of morality lies in a repression which is marked by an 
elevation, the ascending of the nose as to get away from the anal and genital 
organs. Memory stinks, and our turning away our nose from it, is the repression 
by which consciousness escapes from this odor. The turn away from impurity is 
a movement of ascension, and this noble ascension, this highness constitutes the 
very source of morality for Freud. Freud supposes that he finds the origin of the 
law of morality, but on the condition that the track of this origin be lost, in order 
to be able to present the law as the absolute and non-historical. 
The ‘nasal protuberance’ appears in Kafka’s story as well, but this time with “the 
hairs which do not always hide themselves decently inside the nostrils” (p.194). 
Derrida refers to an important moment in the course of the decision of the man 
from the country:  
these [that he is vetoed by the first doorkeeper and there are 
much more terrible doorkeepers he has to face even he manages 
to continue despite the veto] are difficulties the country man has 
not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at 
all times and to everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at 
the door keeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long, 
thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait until 
he gets permission to enter (1992, p.183). 
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After facing this ‘hair promontory’, the man makes a decision, he decides not to 
decide at that moment, and adjourns the decision to enter to another time. This 
delay, for Derrida, is also in our encounter with the story: “Is not what holds us 
in check before the law, like the man from the country, also what paralyzes and 
detains us when confronted with a story…” (1992, p.196)? Hence, “Before the 
Law” is not only the story of the inaccessibility to the law, but also the story of 
the inaccessibility to the story telling that “the story of prohibition is a prohibited 
story” (p.200). 
“Before Before the Law” and “Before the Law” shares a topology according to 
which any access is strictly prohibited. But before the Law there stands also the 
doorkeeper, not only the man from the country. Even if they both stand before 
the law, the doorkeeper is his back turned to it, whereas the man from the 
country is waiting patiently for an opportunity to enter; they stand in opposition 
to each other. Such a split operates also within the title (‘Before the Law’) and 
the narrative body of the story (first line of which is ‘Before the Law’) and it takes 
place because of an “entitling authority, in its topical and juridical function” 
(p.201). The title of the story which comes before the narrative body and 
enframes the literary text is assumed to be both an element of the work and also 
something outside of it. It is indeed this invisible division between the title and 
narrative body which attracts Derrida to the story and not to the same piece of 
text which is also included in the Trial without a title. The title and the very first 
sentence of the story are identical but heterogeneous and they do not cite one 
another because there is not any narrative link between these two occurrences.  
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The occurrence in the entitling is a coup which helps to constitute the story as 
distinct from its appearance in the Trial, to separate the text as another instance. 
Derrida argues for the peculiarity of the occurrence in the title in comparison to 
the occurrence of the same series of words at the very beginning of the story: 
The entitling sentence describes the one who turns his back to 
the law (to turn one’s back also means to ignore, neglect, or even 
transgress)- not in order that the law present itself or that one be 
present to it but, on the contrary, in order to prohibit all 
presentation. The other, who faces the law, sees no more than 
the one who turns his back to it. Neither is in the presence of the 
law. The only two characters in the story are blind and separated 
from one another, and from the law. Such is the modality of this 
rapport, of this relation, of this narration: blindness and 
separation, a kind of non-rapport (1992, pp. 201-202). 
 
This non-rapport also applies to the doorkeepers, the first of whom is at the 
bottom of the hierarchy and also of the cruelty, since he too can not stand to see 
even the third doorkeeper, not to mention the ones following the third. This is 
when the man, as an ordinary person subject to the law, decides to wait: just 
after seeing the nose and hairy appearance of the doorkeeper. What is important 
is that the permission is never absolutely forbidden to the country man but 
rather this story becomes the story of the postponing of the decision to enter. 
For Derrida, “the prohibition of the law is not a prohibition in the sense of an 
imperative constraint; it is a différance” (pp. 202-203). The door is actually 
open, not at all closed, and even the man has the opportunity to have a look at 
this space which separates him from the law, since this door is not “firm, opaque 
or uncrossable” (p.203). Moreover, the doorkeeper does not guard the door 
physically as a physical barrier but rather asks the man “to interrupt and defer 
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the passage, to withhold the pass” (p.203). In this deferral, what this man orders 
himself is not related to the content of the law as law, but rather an order which 
simply states “do not come to me”. Thus, the man standing before the law gains 
access to its demand without an actual confrontation with it, without gaining 
access to the law itself: “one cannot reach the law, and in order to have a rapport 
of respect with it, one must not  have a rapport with the law, one must interrupt 
the relation” (pp. 203-204). The law is in a contradiction of prohibiting itself: 
the man before it is both subject to the law; but having no access, he is outside it 
as well. The delay prompted by the guardian, to whom the man has the only 
access is the différance as an interminable deferral. As this deferral suggests, 
“the discourse of the law does not say ‘no’ but ‘not yet,’ indefinitely” (p.204). Law 
is that which is deferred and it is this very law which dictates such a deferral. 
What should be emphasized here is the coincidence of the ‘brutal’ end of the 
story with the guardian’s shutting of the door. The closure of the door is 
accompanied by the closure of the text. 
The text guards itself, maintains itself – like the law, speaking 
only to itself, that is to say, of its non identity with itself. It 
neither arrives nor lets anyone arrive. It is the law, makes the 
law and leaves the reader before the law (1992, p. 211). 
 
The text also has its own guardians: the translators, critics, readers might be 
considered as the doorkeepers of the text who pursue the self-unity and 
originality of the text against any intrusion. This operation may hold for any text 
indeed, even if we observe a rather explicit form of it in this kind of a self-
referential structure in Kafka’s story which “does and says, saying what it does 
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by doing what it says” (p.212). With the guardian announcing that he is going to 
close the door, Kafka gives an end to the story. 
For Derrida, the man from the country at the door “had difficulty with literature” 
(p.213). What is literature after all when we remove all its historical, 
philosophical, fictional registers? A work is a system of referentiality, a play of 
framing which hardly counts as a gesture in favor of literature. It still counts, 
because it is inevitable to talk about a work when we are dealing with literature, 
since “there is no literature without a work” (p.213). Thus, what distinguishes 
two identical texts, “Before the Law” and its exact appearance in the Trial is the 
way in which the play of referentiality and framework operates within these two 
distinct instances. Yet, Derrida argues that this is still inadequate for any 
demarcation. 
If framing, title and referential structure are necessary for the 
literary work as such to emerge, these conditions of possibility 
still remain too general and hold for the texts to which we would 
hardly ascribe literary value. These possibilities give the text the 
power to make law, beginning with its own. However, this is on 
condition that the text itself can appear before the law of 
another, more powerful text protected by more powerful 
guardians (1992, pp. 213-214). 
 
Kafka’s text with its guardians points to these guardians and to the way they are   
made possible. This duplicity makes it possible to position this text of Kafka 
within literature. It bears an excess too, insofar as it also tells us about the laws 
of literature being at the same time before these laws. This excess is indeed for 
in every work we deem to be a literary work, since the literariness does not 
 72
imply a belonging and inclusion but rather a transformation. “The work, the 
opus, does not belong to the field; it is the transformer of the field” (p.215). 
For Derrida, this excess provides literary texts with a possibility of “subversive 
juridicity”. This subversive juridicity is enacted when the self-identity is not 
assured, nor is the assuring element in the text. Literature does have “a power to 
produce performatively the statements of law, of the law that literature can be, 
and not just of the law to which literature submits” (p.216). These nonlinguistic 
conditions of literature are indeed the most difficult part of the whole 
problematic because, “literature itself makes law, emerging in that place where 
the law is made” (p.216). This performativity might provide these new laws with 
the means to violate the existing laws from which “it derives protection and 
receives its conditions of emergence” (p.216). This is a play with the law, “jouer 
la loi”, by which the performative laws produced are protected by and 
circumvent the law. Hence, the subversive juridicity of literary texts does not 
arise out of a privileged position against the laws it is  governed by, but rather 
by complying this very structure of law making, by imitating and doubling it in 
order to create an opening of disobedience.  
At this juncture we might return to Freud’s attempt to find the origin of moral 
law. The repression lying behind morality is recounted by Freud as an historical 
event in which sons unite and kill their father, for he does not share his wives: a 
crime whose commemoration marks the origin of law. However, one should add, 
this murder is a useless one, since none of the sons will be able to take the place 
of the Father after his death. He becomes even more powerful. This crime turns 
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out to be an event which actually changes nothing, as killing does not actually 
kill the father. “Nothing new happens and yet this nothing new would instate the 
law, the two fundamental prohibitions of totemism, namely murder and incest” 
(p.199). It is an event and non-event which nevertheless make a fictive, historical 
investment. According to Derrida, 
[d]emanding and denying the story, this quasi-event bears the 
mark of fictive narrativity (fiction of narration as well as fiction as 
narration: fictive narration as the simulacrum of narration and not 
only as the narration of an imaginary history). It is the origin of 
literature at the same time as the origin of law –like the dead 
father, a story told, a spreading rumor, without author and end, 
but an ineluctable and unforgettable story. (1992, p.199) 
 
The guilt and remorse sons feel after the murder implies another moral law prior 
to that murder, since if there were not one, the children would not have felt any 
remorse. For Derrida, Freud’s attempt to account for the repetition of this guilt 
which is to be the constituent of the society, cannot provide an account for the 
origin of the law since what it does is only to refer to a previous law.  The guilt as 
an effect is supposed to refer to the sovereignty of this law, in the way the 
Kantian law manifests itself through punishments.  
We might assert that the attempt to find an origin must fail but this ‘must’ comes 
from another law, the law of laws, which is différance.  The singularity of 
literature is in its non-investment in the originarization of the law, its ability to 
make a re-mark which points to this impossibility which makes any law possible.  
This re-marking accompanies a simulacrum of narration which places a non-
event to the origin, a placement that is also the displacement of origin.  
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The opportunity to conform to the rules of the game, yet being able to subvert it, 
informs literature’s call for democracy-to-come. It calls for a new space in which 
the relationship with the law is not only that of submission and repression. By 
this subtle mimesis, literature becomes the positive power of responding to the 
powers and laws it has been regulated by. This is the reason why the subject of 
literature, unlike the determined and fixed subjects and subjectivities of present 
democracies, is both inside and outside the social and political laws. It is this 
subject’s insituatibility within these structures that points to a future democracy.  
The singularity of Bartleby’s undecidable proposition does not come from the 
fact that he gives a response.  It is rather because it produces a statement that 
may even not count as a determinate genuine response.  Bartleby clearly does 
not comply with the model of good citizenry of current democracies with citizens 
who have certain rights and responsibilities, in other words, who have rights 
insofar as they are also responsible. But if Bartleby is not responsible in the 
traditional sense, from where does he take his right to speak? What should be 
emphasized here is that democracy to come is not a simple expansion of certain 
rights and liberties, but rather, an abrupt interruption and displacement of 
current democracies by presenting statements or mode of lives that are 
incalculable according to the truth-governed laws of current democracies.  Thus, 
the democracy to come is not a utopic futurity implied in the expectations of 
good citizens, but rather it is a promise pointed at by the scapegoats 
(pharmakos) or bad citizens of society.  These citizens are not bad because they 
fail to comply with the duties and responsibilities they should perform to be a 
good citizen, but rather because they constitute a case in which the notion of 
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citizenship itself is under critique.  A very peculiar relationship with their 
society, “franchir” and “s’affranchir”, a breaking out and an emancipation, such 
is the frail relationship of Bartleby to his community.  
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4. MIMESIS AND SOCIALITY 
 
In the previous chapters we have discussed the question of literature in its 
relation to mimesis according to the thoughts of Deleuze and Derrida. What we 
have encountered in them both was a political concern. For Deleuze, minor 
literature is a collective assemblage of enunciation which fabulates a people-to-
come. This people-to-come was further characterized as a society of celibates or  
a society without Father. For Derrida, literature, as a simulacrum of narration, 
might acquire a subversive juridicity by a peculiar use of the right to say 
everything for a democracy-to-come. This democracy-to-come requires a certain 
irresponsibility in complying with the responsibilities that current democracies 
impose on their citizens.   
In a way, by detour of their criticism of Platonic philosophy, we have already 
begun a political reading of Deleuze and Derrida by tracing the new sociality 
they announce against the restricted characterizations of what a political society 
is and how it gets formed.5  For Deleuze, the society of celibates is a wall of 
uncemented loose stones whose law is the immanent process of desire. For 
Derrida, the law refers to an impossible passage whose very possibility is 
endowed by the uncontrollable play of différance.  From this perspective, we 
might say that both Deleuze and Derrida’s thoughts present a critique of sociality 
by reformulating the question in terms of an encounter between the singular and 
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the universal, the individual and society.  In Deleuze, becoming as a non-
mimetic process of desubjectivation marks a new sociality with becoming-packs. 
It is evident that these packs are also alliances but very different ones than are 
centralized communities.  These alliances are lines of flight initiated by the pacts 
as in Kafka, Ahab, Bartleby and Masoch. For Deleuze, the nonrepresentability of 
law suggests its being desire, the immanent process of which everything and 
everyone is a part. According to Derrida, the promise of democracy of literature 
is marked by a societal transformation as well. In literature, Derrida sees the 
possibility of abolishing family and the sociality it implies.  Freud’s attempt to 
find the origin of moral law, by trying to recount a historical event of murder, for 
Derrida, turns out to be a non-event in which nothing new occurs except the 
neurotic repetition of guilt, which is assumed to mark the constitution of society.  
For Derrida, the inaccessibility of the law suggests that the law is différance, 
something that resists historical localization.  In this chapter, I will try to 
investigate how people-to-come in Deleuze and democracy-to-come in Derrida 
differ from our current communities and democracies by following the traces of 
their criticism of Platonic mimesis.  
Still, one should be cautious to formulate this question in a normative way since 
what we are investigating is not the conditions of an utopia we are seeking to 
realize.  The people-to-come of Deleuze has nothing to do with an ideal utopia, 
but rather is a fabulation that gets actualized differently in the texts of Masoch, 
Sade, Kafka, Melville or others. Nor is Derrida trying to give the future 
conditions of democracy. To the contrary, the idea of futurity stands for an 
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encounter with an other which can not be subsumed under the expectations and 
estimations of the present.    
At this juncture, we might make a detour through a traditional concept of 
political philosophy –social contract- to discuss the new forms of sociality 
implied by our previous discussions with regard to Deleuze’s and Derrida’s 
thoughts.  The concept of social contract has been carefully considered, revised 
and transformed throughout the history of political philosophy. It has been a 
keyword for discussing the origin of authority, its sustainment and justification. 
The web of components that build up this concept has also been through drastic 
modifications: the state of nature, self-interested individuals, power, state, 
sovereignity, government, morality, rationality, property, justice and God has 
been discussed in various forms as a validation of the socialities proposed in 
these theories of social contract. Within this lineage of transformation, the 
concept of social contract also relates and connects to other concepts, since  for 
every concept, “there are usually bits or components that come from other 
concepts, which correspond to other problems and presuppose other planes”  
(Deleuze & Guattari, P.18). Here, we will try to reconsider the presuppositions of 
the concept of social contract which provides the political norms of society. In 
my opinion, there is an affinity between the notion of society we find in 
conractarian theories and the idealist philsophy of Plato.  Although the theories 
of social contract are quite different from each other in their conceptual 
investments, its juxtaposition with the question of mimesis might reveal the 
‘dogmatic’ image of sociality prevailing in political philosophy.  
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In Plato’s Crito (1989), Socrates gives an explanation to Crito as to why one 
should abide by the laws of the State and ought to endure the punishments 
explicated by them. In this dialogue, Socrates imagines that the laws of Athens 
start to talk to him asking a few questions regarding Socrates’s will to disavow 
the punishment. Socrates’s self-questioning is as follows: 
Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies 
you in attempting to destroy us and the State? In the first place did 
we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother 
by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to 
urge against those of us who regulate marriage?… Or against those 
of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children 
in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge 
of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and 
gymnastic? ... Well, then, since you were brought into the world 
and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place 
that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? 
And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you 
think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. 
Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to 
a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been 
struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his 
hands?...  (1989, p. 481) 
 
Socrates argues for an implicit contract which is the very foundation of the State 
which made him the individual he is then, and hence Socrates with no hesitation 
should obey what the laws of the State require, even if he thinks that the 
punishment is, seemingly, unjust.  These questions might be summarized in the 
following question: Would it be just to break “the covenants and agreements”, 
after one has enjoyed all the opportunities it has provided one with? These 
questions murmur in Socrates’ ears, a murmur which prevents Socrates to hear 
any thing else and leaves Crito speechless as well: “I have nothing to say, 
Socrates.”  Looking at this dialogue, we might assert that the contractarian 
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thought prevails in history of philosophy before the term of social contract was 
coined in the text of later political philosophers.  
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls are the prominent thinkers of 
contractarian thought and have discussed how political authority is established 
and sustained in a society. What counts as the common trait of all these different 
formulations is that there stands at least one contract which accounts for a 
passage from a nonpolitical state to a political state. The debates mainly revolve 
around the context of the prepolitical period to figure out the conditions which 
make the passage to a political society a necessary, inevitable event.  Rationality 
and morality are two important topics since the idea of contract supposes a kind 
of general consent and this consent is proposed either as a rational or moral 
choice and sometimes as both. The problem is to account for how people may 
pursue their own benefits without preventing others from pursuing their own, as 
moral or rational agents. These theories attempt to give an account of an actual 
state and try to explain it by going to the originary instant of its emergence, this 
origin being an actual or a hypothetical event. In the light of these 
characteristics, we might reformulate the social contract provisionally as a 
concept that stands for a theory which attempts to explain and justify the social 
organization of humans and the necessary grounds of sustaining such an 
organization around the abovementioned subconcepts. These theories try to 
describe the conditions under which free individuals ought to obey the terms of 
contract. The whole attempt is to give an explanation for this negotiated passage 
to the state of “must”, from natural to the political, from phusis to nomos.  
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In the society of contract, one’s right and responsibilities are inferred from the 
contract agreed upon. Standing as the origin or as the cause of political society, 
the rules of the contract apply to anybody in the society.  We may reformulate 
the question in the light of Socrates’ fidelity to the laws of the state. When people 
may have the right to breach the contract, in what conditions is one’s 
disobedience to the sovereignty justified? If we have already justified obedience 
by morality or rationality, is disobedience ever tolerable? According to Hobbes, 
for instance, “ there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the 
sovereign; and consequently none of its subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, 
can be freed from his subjection” (in Lessnoff, 1990, p.62). Kant is even more 
conservative in this point, for in a Kantian society, “all resistance against 
supreme legislative power, all incitement of subjects to violent expressions of 
discontent… is the greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth…. 
Even if the power of state or its agent …has violated the contract… the subject is 
still not entitled to offer counter-resistance” (p.133). Kant’s revolutionary 
reversal of Platonic hierarchy of Good and Law in favor of the Law, turns out to 
be a ground for an unshakable sovereignty. This Kantian conception of 
sovereignty is almost the opposite of the notion of popular sovereignty proposed 
by Rousseau. Popular sovereignty implies that ultimate sovereignty lies on the 
side of the people. This sovereignty is sustained by the general will whose 
injustice is impossible as “no one is unjust to himself.” But, for Rousseau, 
although the passage from State of Nature to the political society is an 
ambivalent one in that it can not be comfortably considered as a progress, still, if 
the citizen’s actions are not in harmony with the general will, they might be 
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forced to act so. Hence, the freedom of the individual is always subject to the 
control of the general will and the harmony between the individual and the 
general will is always presumed and if not so, then the sovereign might use its 
legitimate power to establish such a harmony.  The contract stands for 
legitimizing the force that pulls the individual towards the center of society, the 
governance of the law of general.  
Recent theories on contractual thought have provided a thorough criticism of the 
premises of social contract. Carol Pateman in her renowned book, The Sexual 
Contract (1988), claims that the social contract is not inclusive of everyone in 
the society, but rather it stands for a pact among men in order to dominate 
women.  For Pateman, if the idea of social contract at first sight stands for the 
idea of equality, it is only because it distributes the power of the father among 
sons.  She refers to the genesis of civilization as argued by Freud according to 
which brothers convene among themselves against the sovereignty of the father 
who reserves the power of domination of woman.  Social contract is such a 
convention in which brothers unite to share the tyranny of the father in his sole 
sovereignty of dominating women.  Pateman’s critic has opened a new path of 
criticism to which many others have also contributed. Many others, for instance, 
have pointed to economic structure of contractarian theories to claim that social 
contracts also assume bourgeois men as its participants.  Charles W. Mills, as 
well, in his book Racial Contract (1999) attempts to show that this contract is 
also a racial consensus on the exclusion of others. This way of thought 
contributed substantially to consider contractarian thought as a covenant which 
excludes minority concerns, as the conditions of being able to take part in the 
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contract became of critical importance. In other words, the question has evolved 
into that of ‘Who is the agent of rights and responsibilities within a society?’ 
Can social contract become more and more ‘just’ as we re-inscribe the minority 
groups excluded from being part of the contract back into consensus? This is an 
impossible vocation because, the contractarian thought of sociality is such that it 
is almost constructed on an idea of exclusion however much we try to ameliorate 
it by including the excluded ones. In this sense, contractarian thought of 
sociality is a Platonic enterprise of thought because a) it works according to the 
model of the ideal citizen whose rights and responsibilities are strictly 
determined according to the convention b) For the establishment of the well-
order of the society, bad citizens, the pharmakos must always be expelled out of 
society or punished by the laws to restore their obedience. In this sense, social 
contract is the tool by which the model of ideal citizenship is negotiated. 
However, it does not only sustain the law of the good, but also tries to sort out 
the bad citizens who threat the well-being of the society. 
What is dangerous for the Platonic society is an individual’s inspiration to be 
several things rather than one. The project of Platonic philosophy, of political 
philosophy as well, was to distinguish the false pretenders of the society from the 
ones who make the genuine claims. This was the very reason why Plato did not 
like democracy: it is a regime in which anybody can lay claim for anything. The 
philosophical investment of Platonic philosophy, as Deleuze critically outlines, is 
the very problem of making difference. The Ideas in Plato are not only the 
perfect models which everything approximate, but the model provides Plato with 
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the tools he seeks in order to distinguish the genuine and the fake. The Idea 
marks the center of a hierarchy around which everything is ranked according to 
the degree of resemblance to the Idea. Making difference is hastily reduced to an 
operation of resemblance. Likewise, the movement of social contract is the 
movement of Platonic ideals: it marks the origin of the laws by way of which we 
distinguish good and bad. The ideal controls the differences of individuals on the 
basis of an ideal model and sets the limits for the spectrum of allowed difference. 
Similar to the manner in which the competition between the false pretendants is 
alleviated with a recourse to their original models, the competing self interests of 
individuals are resolved thanks to the social contract which suggests the laws 
any individual must conform to. The contract does not only stand for the origin 
of the state or sovereignty, but also for the very creation of the model of good 
citizenship and the proper way of taking part in the society. A contract includes 
contractual terms which bind the parties of the contract, and in case of a breach 
of contract, the party who fails to comply with its terms is punished. Thus, as the 
welfare of the society is assumed to be dependant on the social contract, from 
this contract arises institutions which justify their authority in this promised 
welfare. In that way, the social contract is the means by which the society creates 
the terms of the regulating laws and a mechanism which ensures the sustained 
compliance with the provisions of these laws. Although the interests of the 
individual parties differ from each other, this difference is subdued to a harmony 
which reconciles differences under the regulation of a law. Sophists in the 
Platonic view of society are the bad citizens because they deteriorate the 
principle of resemblance the Platonic thought relies upon. They spoil the order 
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of the society, which is why sophistry must be banned or expelled. The 
hypothetical social contract requires different individuals come together and 
relate to each other by a creation of an ideal similarity which they converge upon 
by the terms of the contract. By this contract, we are provided with a a model of 
good citizenship, an ideal citizen according to which each citizen is evaluated. 
Within a contractarian perspective, Bartleby, with his queer formula, was surely 
a bad citizen. His undecidable statement “I would prefer not to” which neither 
affirms nor negates anything determinate, was surely not a behavior in 
accordance with his responsibilities. In this non-response of Bartleby, Derrida 
recognizes a responsibility which he himself creates. By such an undecidable 
statement, Bartleby is able to breach the contract without relying on the 
framework of rights and responsibilities this contract imposes and without being 
a straight rebel at the same time. Bartleby’s life is not calculable by the terms of 
the contract that governs current sociality. He almost finds or invents a gap in 
the terms of contract so that he cannot be said to simply disavow his 
responsibilities. His operation is a delicate one which creates his right to refuse 
by a politics of hesitation without making any recourse to the rights spared to 
him. He creates his rights and his new way of being responsible. The ideal model 
of citizen is not capable of locating and ranking Bartleby in the society. Hence, 
he must be bad, a bad citizen. Like the Sophist, the pharmakos, who lays claim 
on genuine truth without having any right to do so, Bartleby embodies the power 
of the false to undermine this idea of the ideal citizen whose rights and 
responsibilities are fixed and delineated by the contract.  
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With the idea of social contract, we are presented with an evolutionary schema 
in which all humans are better off by getting into communities of a complex kind 
by leaving their rudimentary forms of societal interactions.  An evolutionary 
schema by which the rudimentary bands of human beings turn into members of 
a political civil society. The criticisms made by Pateman, Mills and other 
thinkers are very important as they point to a before of the contract and to the 
dynamics in the processes preceding the contract. Within such a perspective, the 
contract turns out to be an alliance, cooperation among a group at the cost of  
exclusion, non-consideration and domination of some other group. Thus, the 
self-interested individuals come together only for a group interest, who assume 
the interest of their group represents the well-being of the whole society. But 
where are the animals, where are the plants? Do they not play any role in this 
very constitution of political society?  
Social interactions can never be reduced to relations among human beings. Of 
course, by saying that, we are still pertaining to a school of criticism 
interrogating the agent of rights and responsibilities, in that this school of 
criticism with a focus on minorities was attempt to illuminate what constitutes 
the point of consensus of the contract: the covenant of resemblances to exclude 
the different. With this line of criticism it is clear that the subject of the contract 
is not anyone but rather particular people who already bear certain historical 
and cultural attributes such as gender, social status, race, and humanity- we 
might also add. This idea is easily verifiable when we look at Kant’s 
understanding of political society. Kant makes a distinction between active and 
passive citizens on the basis of people’s status as independent individuals. 
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According to this division, only active independent citizens are eligible to vote 
and passive citizens who consist of women and children who are dependent 
beings by nature and the servants and tutors who are dependent because of the 
their social context, “do not have civil personality” (in Lessnoff, 1990, p.126). 
Hence, they are not eligible to participate in the mechanism that determines the 
terms of the law with which the society is governed. Passive citizens always obey 
and active citizens determine what is to be obeyed, both of them constituting the 
society as free and equal individuals whose freedom is established by their 
dependence on the law. We have been delineating a movement of exclusion, but 
are we going to be content with other kinds of social formation in which the 
excluded parties, be it the women or the black, are to be incorporated into the 
active citizens? What should be emphasized is that, the model of social contract 
is there to justify the obedience of all citizens. It characterizes citizenship as an 
institution of obedience. It does not only point to an obligation to the political 
authority, but indeed this obligation is an obligation to the law of resemblances 
which is the very law governing political sovereignty.    
The political society that emerges out of a social contract endows individuals 
with certain rights and responsibilities. Within this allocated sphere of 
movement, everybody is free and is a good citizen as long as they remain faithful 
to the contract, being faithful to the model of good citizenship. When Hume 
problematized the temporality of both actual and hypothetical contracts, he casts 
the question of faithfulness yet another way. If it was a nonhistorical 
hypothetical contract, then what enables the passage from the hypothetical state 
to the actual state and how can we stick to the idea that it will be binding for 
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actual citizens as well? Or even when the contract is held to be an actual one, 
what would guarantee the faithfulness of coming generations? If we are going to 
explain this faith by its utility to every individual, then why the insistence on a 
contract in order to acknowledge such an interest? Hume’s arguments are 
important in that it reveals a certain detour the contractarian arguments appeal 
to. Masoch’s criticism of contract we outlined in the previous chapter is in a way 
a Humean criticism, since it was also a questioning of obedience on the basis of a 
contract which is applied to the third parties who not having taken part in it. 
When taken as a historical phenomenon, social contract enters the field of 
ethnology. Pierre Clastres (1987) has prominently argued against the 
evolutionist arguments of State formation as a passage from rudimentary 
societal organizations to complex ones.  From primitive to sophisticated, from 
simple to complex: Clastres demonstrated how the social relations within the 
primitive societies are no less intricate than the societies of State. He argued that 
these underdeveloped primitive societal relationships were very delicate and 
cautious in the sense that they involved practices as to prevent state formation.  
Routine social practices of highly structured societies are actively averted by the 
so-called primitives. For instance, in Guayaki tribes, there are leaders only as the 
spokesperson of the tribe and any authoritive attribute of such a position is 
vigorously avoided.  Hence, for Clastres, that state is something these societies 
lack or that it is a “must” for them, is an unjustifiable assumption of evolutionist 
anthropology. What is significant in Clastres’s thought is his understanding of 
the State of Nature. The concept of State of Nature, in contractarian theories 
describes the situation before the emergence of the political society by a social 
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contract.  For example, Hobbes maintains that State of Nature is an egoist 
period in which every individual seeks to satisfy their wills and wants no matter 
what harm they might give to others. Locke, on the other hand, stresses that 
individuals in the State of Nature are not that cruel to the interest of others, 
because they are already rational beings. The necessity of the relinquishing the 
State of Nature is due to its risky nature in which there is no guarantee that 
every body will continue to enjoy their rights freely without the intrusion of 
others (in Lessnoff, 1990).  Regardless of the way it describes the relations of 
individuals in that period of time, State of Nature logically and temporally 
precedes the political society in that it stands for the circumstances which make 
the contract inevitable. It stands for a war-like period or a period that is marked 
by a possibility of war in which members of society encounter certain threats as 
a result of which they seek solutions and get ready for making concessions.  
Clastres introduced a novel understanding for State of Nature: if it was a war-
like period, it was only because there was a war against the formation of the 
state, annulling the inevitability of such a passage. 
This novel understanding of war is under consideration of Deleuze and Guattari 
in A Thousand Plateaus (2004), when they ask “Is there a way of warding off the 
formation of a State apparatus (or its equivalent in a group)” (p. 393)?  They 
share with Clastres the view that nomadic war-machine is against the state, be it 
virtual or actual, by aiming to prevent or destruct it. But, what remains 
unanswered in the framework of Clastres’s argument is how the state emerges in 
spite of the social practices primitive societies develops  to avert the formation of 
the state. The more Clastres argues for the self-sufficiency of the primitive 
 90
societies, the more he attributes their exteriority to an independence. Against 
the evolutionist formula which characterizes an inevitable passage from a 
primitive society to a highly structured one, Clastres was only able to offer an 
unexplainable break between these steps: between the self-sufficient primitive 
sociality and the miraculous emergence of the State. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
such a break would not suffice for Clastres to leave the evolutionist hypothesis 
behind; his understanding of primitive societies recuperates a sort of State of 
Nature: evolution not as a development but as abrupt transformation. 
Still, according to Deleuze and Guattari, we must do away with the classification 
of communities as inferior packs or structured communities.  Bands and herds 
should not count as inferior social forms just because they are not marked with 
determinate characteristics. The dynamism of pack is sustained by two positions 
or forces within the pack multiplicity. Firstly, the central position which tries to 
collect and gather the individuals in the pack inside.  Secondly, a peripheral 
position, a point in which the individual cannot be determinately told whether it 
still is in the pack or not. This periphery is the zone of indiscernability, the 
borderline of a pack multiplicity beyond which there lies another multiplicity 
characterized with its own borderline.  Think of a swarm of mosquitoes with 
their constant movement inside and outside of their brisk packs. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, assuming the central movement of a pack as the principal position 
for this pack explain the conjugal or familial communities or the communities of 
the State-type in general. Even though every pack multiplicity involves ‘vectors 
of deterritorialization’ or centrifugal movements, evolutionism takes the force of 
centralization as the progress of society.  Social contract, likewise, stands for this 
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force of homogenization where the individuals are pulled back towards the 
inside. On the other hand, the becoming of multiplicity takes places via a 
peripheral movement which connects with other multiplicities in their zone of 
indiscernability. As these two ways of movement characterizing a pack 
multiplicity suggest, all the societies, even the primitive ones are vulnerable to 
authoritive formation of family or nation states whenever they are defined by 
their centers rather than peripheries or borderlines.  
But then, how should one explain the emergence of the State apparatus, the 
commonly recognized political authority? For Deleuze and Guattari, “there has 
always been a State, quite perfect, quite complete” (2004, p. 397). What they 
stress is the relationship of State to its outside, an inevitable and fundamental 
relationship.  What marks the sovereignty of the State are these movements of 
internal localization, hence it involves the law of interiority and exteriority 
rather than that of State and counter-State as it is in Clastres. But the outside of 
States should not be reduced to relationships among States.  Deleuze and 
Guattari propose two directions for this exteriority:  
… huge worldwide machine   branched  out over the entire 
ecumenon at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of 
autonomy in relation to the States (for example, commercial 
organization of the “multinational” type, or industrial complexes, or 
even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic 
or messianic movements, etc.); but also the local mechanism of 
bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of 
segmentarity societies in opposition to the organs of State power 
(2004, p.397). 
 
These directions of exteriority, it should be noted, are not mutually exclusive 
insofar as we might observe them equally in all social fields.  They do not also 
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stand apart from the state in a relationship of independence, but rather in a 
relationship of “coexistence and competition” (p. 398).  According to this 
perspective, one may propose that the contract under investigation is not the 
thing by which the sovereignty, the political authority of State emerges, but 
rather it is the result of such a sovereignty, a kind of coming together which 
takes State as its model. Under such a contract, the individuals, with due rights 
and responsibilities are determined for what they ought “to be” in the society. 
For this reason, what we are going to suggest is that sovereignty is not an 
outcome of this social contract as an authority to which everybody in the society 
is responsible. The contract is not a formation of authority, but an authoritive 
formation that operates on a particular understanding of sovereignty. The 
sovereignty implied by a contract is of course Hegeliean rather than Bataillean, 
since we know that Bataillean sovereignty itself stands as something 
uncontractable, in other words, it points to that which escapes consumption 
within the zone of controllable localities.  According to Derrida, 
… there is no sovereignty itself.  Sovereignty dissolves the value of 
meaning , truth and a grasp-of-the-thing-itself.  This is why the 
discourse it opens above all is not true, truthful, or “sincere”. 
Sovereignty is the impossible, therefore it is not, it is –Bataille 
writes this word in italics- “this loss” (1978, pp. 270-271). 
 
Sovereignty, for Bataille, is already a loss, which is not to be transported to the 
internal body of homogeneity, but rather is that which establishes its différance 
as a radical heterogeneity to be sustained. Social contract, on the other hand, is a 
contract of homogenization. It is the positioning of every individual in a society 
before the terms of a contract.  Sovereignty as a moral or rational outcome which 
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sustains the order of society is thus presented as something that gathers all the 
citizens within a totalizable homogeneity. The assumed sovereignty of the social 
contract as a law which has to protect itself as well is a force that is assumed to 
leave no exteriority with regard to itself. Sovereignty stands for this very force 
where any deviance from the consensus is brought back to the center again by 
marking it by guilt or punishment. But we have seen that for Derrida any 
originary moment for a law is a necessary impossibility, originarization being 
made possible by the play of différance itself. Hence the sovereignty of the law, 
for Derrida can only be a moment of confrontation which is not exhaustible 
either by an absolute accountability or unaccountability. The restricted sense of 
sovereignty implied in contract theories is only possible with the Bataillean 
sovereignty that comes before the law of society, law of morality even law of 
physics as well in an absolute past which cannot be summed up in any presence. 
Hence the democracy-to-come is always a future event in the form of a promise.  
Accordingly, the unrepresentability of law is due to the play of différance, which 
constantly postpones the possibility of any appropriation.  Thus, unlike 
Pateman, Derrida does not see a successful originarization of society in Freud, 
since the murder of father is already a failure. Social contract as a law binding all 
the individuals in the society can not be accounted for by a passage from non-
law to law, since the law of laws, différance forbids such a passage. For Derrida, 
it is this very impossibility of passage we should keep in mind, because it is the 
very condition of the possibility of law as well. If at the origin of the society, 
there lies nothing but the non-event of différance, the democracy-to-come is the 
sociality that sustains the play of différance with respect to the position of the 
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individual before the law of society.  Without formalizing a future utopia, it is the 
welcoming of this impossibility of successful inclusion. We have already stated 
that the social contract cannot be ameliorated by further inclusions, because it is 
this very passion to include and subsume that counts as the restricted sense of 
sovereignty.  That which constituted the possibility of a Platonic society will have 
to confront the sophists both with its poison and its cure: as an outsider who is 
able transform the society from inside.  Pharmakos as the wizard or scapegoat as 
the bad citizen is the very threat to the established order of the Platonic society. 
Likewise, for Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is a practice of sorcery, of wizardry 
since it always includes an alliance, a pact with the devil. But this pact gives the 
sorcerer the ability to create a hole in the contract which tries to subsume him 
within the shackles of being.  
Direk(2005) interprets Derrida’s criticism of Freud about the origin of law in the 
light of other occasions of Derridean contemplation on Freudian thought. As 
crime cannot be crime without a law preceding it, the double occurrence of law, 
both before and after its foundation, is a similar movement with the double 
temporality of nachträglichkeit of traumatic experiences. As the foundation of 
the law depends on a crime as the neurotic repetition of guilt, for Freud, it is not 
important whether this event has really taken place. Phantasy comes before 
reality for neurosis and this very fact defies the question of actuality of this 
event. What Derrida does here is indeed a very close tracing of the route 
followed by Freudian thought, but by going one step further, he argues that the 
nachträglichkeit of this non-event is the affirmation of the deference of the law, 
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since it defers any idea of foundation being at the same time the possibility of 
any founding.    
At this juncture, Direk’s introduction of the question of the signature to the law 
is of crucial importance, since contractarian view of society assumes a sign 
expressing presence and consent, no matter whether this consent is ensured on 
rational or moral grounds. The signature manifests an undecidable play here, 
since it displaces the Austinian distinction between  performative and constative 
speech acts or between the daily language and theoretical language. “The 
Declaration of Independence of The United States of America” is signed by 
Thomas Jefferson in the name of a people, who are not only declared but also 
constituted by this very declaration.  As both a declaration and a constitution, 
the sign not only represents the signing public but presents the public who is 
supposed to sign as well.  We may witness this presentation in the following part 
of the declaration. 
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, 
in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge 
of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, 
and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies, 
solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and 
of Right ought to be Free and Independent States… (Jefferson, 
2005, p.5)  
 
This declaration refers to the “good people” of the states as the source of 
authority and representation where the term good, “guarantees the goodwill of 
the signer and the merit of the signature” (Direk, 2005, p. 130). The logic of 
supplementarity which works by creating exclusions founds another opposition 
(good/bad) here at the very movement of originarization and hence immediately 
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renounces the pharmakos.  Indeed, this movement of creating such a nation was 
for Deleuze, the very reason of failure of American revolution of pragmatism.  
All these explain why we cannot conveniently label Deleuze and Derrida as 
contractarian or non-contractarian philosophers. Deleuze is non-contractarian 
because he is against all State-type communities which are governed by the 
movement of centralization. He is also contractarian in the sense that at the 
borderlines of a pack multiplicity, one always enters a demonic pact with 
another individual at the border of another multiplicity, in order to sustain a 
constant escape from the force of internalization, invoking a people-to-come in 
literary acts of enunciation. Derrida, too, is both contractarian and 
noncontractarian. He disavows the possibility of the historicization of law of 
contract but at the same time affirms this impossibility for the law of différance, 
which is the very leeway literature subtly resorts to in its simulacral repetition of 
narrativity to point to the promise of democracy. Hence, in Deleuze and Derrida, 
we might claim that the society of contract is replaced by a contract-to-come in 
which the conjugal relationships of interiority are broken, this “distraction” 
being the very possibility of the future “contract” as well. By this future contract, 
Platonic society governed by the law of ideal citizen is displaced by the sorcery of 
becoming and wizardry of scapegoats, in Deleuze and Derrida respectively.  
 
 
 
 97
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, we have focused on Deleuze and Derrida’s criticism of Platonic 
mimesis, and on their reading of literature as a way of criticizing and 
reformulating the concept of sociality. For this aim, a detour to Platonic mimesis 
and literature is fruitful and almost inevitable, as the political philosophies of 
Deleuze and Derrida do not propose blueprints of a future democracy or 
sociality.  For Deleuze, the overturning of Platonism is necessary as it is devoid 
of making difference without subjecting differences to the law of resemblance.  
Derrida’s careful rereading of the Platonic chain of concepts proceeds by 
emphasizing the logic of supplementarity and the movement of exclusion in his 
theoretical formulations.  In the first chapter, we have argued that the question 
of mimesis is never reducible to an aesthetic, literary or political domain, but 
rather is better studied on the borders of these domains. What Deleuze and 
Derrida’s complementary criticisms of mimesis revealed is how Platonic 
philosophy of mimesis is accompanied by positioning of the Sophists as bad 
citizens. 
Deleuze’s introduction of becoming in place of being in Platonic philosophy and 
Derrida’s questioning of the Platonic “is” have been studied in the second 
chapter. This discussion took place in the context of literature, since for Deleuze 
and Guattari, writing as a passage of life is a process of becoming.  It is through 
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becoming that the question of literature immediately connects to sociality, since 
becomings always involve becomings-multiple, becomings-pack via demonic 
pacts.  In the second part of this chapter, we have discussed the implications of 
the question “what is literature”.  Taking literature as an institution endowed 
with the authority to say everything, Derrida argues that this authority to say 
everything might be turned back upon the law since literature emerges where 
laws get constituted as their simulacra. The subversive potential of literature is 
not taken for granted as an element of literariness, but requires incessant lines 
of flight for Deleuze and keeping the play of différance within the constitution of 
law of literature for Derrida. We might recognize how a certain criticism of 
mimesis links to the question of sociality: for Deleuze, becoming as a non-
mimetic process is always a becoming-multiple and for Derrida, the simulacral 
repetition of the law is the very questioning of the relationship between the 
particular and the general.  
In the third chapter, we have presented prevalent ways of thinking the social. 
Following a Platonic stance, the individual in the society gets evaluated 
according to its conformity to an ideal citizen whose rights and responsibilities 
are delineated by the sovereign.  This view of sociality has been almost reversed 
in Kantian thought according to which the law of society does not take its 
sovereignty from its compliance with the perfect, but rather the good is 
subordinated to the law, perfection to the sovereignty.  We have been able to 
draw these inclinations in contractarian views of political society.  The model of 
ideal citizen relies upon the Platonic premises of mimesis for the model-copy 
hierarchy it sustains. With Deleuze’s criticism of Platonic thought, the 
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emancipation of simulacra from models, leads us to a society of difference rather 
than a society of unity or similarity.  In a complementary way, Derrida’s point is 
to reveal the logic of supplementarity and the mechanism of scapegoat creation 
within such approaches to sociality, these scapegoats being the promise of 
another democracy-to-come. Although Kantian interpretation of law of society 
attempts to overcome the problem of self-sufficient ahistorical authority, we 
argued how it always moves toward an idea of origin, be it an actual or 
hypothetical one, in its attempt of effacing it, and thereby sustaining a 
transcendentality. At that matter, for Deleuze and Guattari, there has always 
been State since any multiplicity involves both lines of stratification and of 
destratification, and the issue is how the multiplicities will be defined. Their 
criticism of the evolutional view of anthropology holds that society has been 
defined by the force which homogenizes and carries the individuals of a society 
back toward the center.  The social significance of the becoming-pack lies in its 
following the reverse force, the centrifugal force of deterritorialization.  This 
force involves a pact, a pact with the Anomolous of another multiplicity, who 
entertains a frail and peripheral relationship with its own multiplicity.  As 
becoming is a never-ending process, these pacts are not originary sources of 
building a society taking place in the past, but their revolutionariness come from 
their future promise for the sociality of a people-to-come.  Derridean criticism of 
the originarization of law revolves around the Freudian interpretation of the 
institution of law. For Freud, the law originates with a crime in which brothers 
unite to kill their father who does not share his access to the mother. Upon the 
killing of the father, the father returns even stronger in the form of a neurotic 
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guilt which prohibits the children from murder and incest. According to Derrida, 
this origin of law requires a law that precedes it, since without that law children 
would not have felt any guilt of violation.  This is an impossible passage for 
Derrida, since at the origin of the law there lies the non-origin, that is the law of 
différance. Hence, if the passage between phusis and nomos prohibits 
penetration, this prohibition does not come from the transcendence of the law, 
but from the law of différance which defers any appropriation. It is due to this 
deferral that Derrida considers democracy as something to-come as a future 
promise.  The emphasis on futurality in both Deleuze’s and Derrida’s political 
thoughts avoids assuming an originary constitution of sociality as a linear 
passage, along with bringing a novel understanding of temporality.  
Deleuze and Derrida see the sorcery of becoming and the wizardry of pharmakos 
respectively as that which points to this future sociality.  Their broad view of 
society disseminates many other interwoven questions of jurisprudence, 
psychoanalysis, anthropology and ethology.  What we have tried to do in this 
thesis was to follow a certain lineage within this resonance by following the 
criticism of Platonic mimesis in and through minor or subversive literatures.  
Other lineages of the political propositions of Deleuzian and Derridean 
philosophies remain to be studied and restudied still as the most promising 
social critiques.  
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NOTES 
 
 
1  We should note the affinity between Deleuze and Guattari in the works they 
have published together or individually. 
 
 
2  We might consider the complementarity of economy and finance parallel to 
that of algebra and geometry Plotnitsky offers in “Algebras, Geometries and 
Topologies of the Fold: Deleuze, Derrida and Quasi-Mathematical Thinking 
(with Leibniz and Mallarmé)” in Patton & Protevi (2003). 
 
3  See Gebauer & Wulf (1992) for a detailed presentation of various usages of the 
concept of mimesis across Plato’s texts, in Part 1 of the book, pp. 25- 60.   
 
4  See Lambert (2000)  where Lambert follows two common interests of Deleuze 
and Derrida, namely Artaud and Bartleby, in order to discuss what their 
philosophies ‘share’. In this article, Lambert interestingly suggests that Deleuze’s 
text on Bartleby might indeed be read as  a text commenting on Derrida.   
 
5  See Patton (2000) for an evaluation of traditional concepts of  political 
philosophy from a Deleuzian perspective without manifesting the easy reflex of 
labelling them as simply irrelevant.  Beardsworth (1996) , discussing the 
politicality of Derridean thought, proceeds on another route putting an emphasis 
on the notion of aporia.   
